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THE CONFUSION TRAP: RETHINKING PARODY IN
TRADEMARK LAW
David A. Simon*
Abstract: This Article suggests using existing doctrinal levers in trademark law to
accommodate parodies in a more balanced fashion. To reach this conclusion, this Article
examines the parody doctrine in U.S. trademark law using two lenses. The first lens is
trademark doctrine itself. Here I explore the various approaches courts use to resolve
trademark disputes involving parody. The other lens is copyright law. Through this lens I
examine how courts deciding trademark parody disputes employ the Supreme Court’s most
recent decision on parody in copyright, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. (1994). I also use
this decision to examine the relationship between copyright and trademark parody claims. In
other words, I ask the following question: how, if at all, are copyright and trademark claims
related in parody cases?
Each perspective reveals something different. The first perspective shows that most
courts resolve infringement claims by evaluating parody within some form of the likelihood
of confusion test. It also shows that most courts assess dilution claims by analyzing parody as
a form of noncommercial speech. The second perspective shows that copyright and
trademark claims are related in a positive direction: if a parody case involves both copyright
and trademark claims, courts always find for the defendant (no infringement) on both claims.
Filtering the analysis through these two lens, I seek to sketch two revised parody tests—one
for infringement and one for dilution. Both tests attempt to differentiate parody analyses from
the traditional likelihood of confusion and dilution tests. These new approaches—which
strengthen speech protections but do not create absolute defenses—account for the legitimate
interests of both trademark owners and parodists.
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A parody [of a trademark] must convey
two simultaneous—and contradictory—
messages: that it is the original, but also
that it is not the original and is instead a
parody. 1
—The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
For the purposes of copyright law, the
nub of the definitions, and the heart of
any parodist’s claim to quote from
existing material, is the use of some

* Fellow, Project on Law and Mind Sciences, Harvard Law School. Thanks to Graeme Dinwoodie,
William Fisher III, Laura Heymann, and Lisa Ramsey for insightful comments and advice. This
Article benefitted greatly from the financial support provided by a 2011 Summer Academic
Fellowship at Harvard Law School. Thanks also to the Washington Law Review for their diligent
work.
1. Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Grp., Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 494 (2d Cir.
1989).
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elements of a prior author’s composition
to create a new one that, at least in part,
comments on that author’s works. 2
—The Supreme Court of the United States
INTRODUCTION
This Article argues that the current parody doctrine in trademark law
needs adjustment. Currently courts analyze parody claims, and often
draw on copyright law to resolve trademark claims that involve parody.
This has resulted in a distortion of trademark law when applied to
parodies—in part because courts focus too much on an expanded notion
of confusion, and in part because courts draw broadly, instead of
narrowly, from copyright law’s approach to parody. Nevertheless, the
surgical procedure trademark law needs can be relatively painless. Some
courts already use the tools to make the necessary nips and tucks.
Trademark law—indeed language itself—is responsible for at least
part of the problem courts have confronted in the parody context.
Comedian George Carlin recognized the force and confusion of
language when he quipped, “I recently went to a new doctor and noticed
he was located in something called the Professional Building. I felt
better right away.” 3 It is the underlying features of language that makes
regulating trademark law difficult: words are powerful. They rouse
emotions. They evoke memories. They move you. 4 With so much
human potential, it is no wonder that people sue each other over them.
“South Butt,” 5 “Mutant of Omaha,” 6 “Chewy Vuiton,” 7 “Richard
Grasso” 8: Each one of these phrases incited a lawsuit 9—and in each one
of these lawsuits the defendant claimed the use of the word(s) was

2. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994).
3. George Carlin Quotes, THINKEXIST.COM, http://thinkexist.com/quotes/george_carlin/ (last
visited Aug. 10, 2013).
4. See, e.g., Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational
Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129 (2003).
5. North Face Apparel Corp. v. Williams Pharmacy, Inc., No. 4:09-cv-02029, 2010 WL 546921
(E.D. Mo. Feb. 9, 2009) (order denying South Butt’s motion to dismiss).
6. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 648 F. Supp. 905 (D. Neb. 1986), aff’d, 836 F.2d 397 (8th
Cir. 1987).
7. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC (Louis Vuitton II), 507 F.3d 252 (4th
Cir. 2007).
8. New York Stock Exch., Inc. v. Gahary, 196 F. Supp. 2d 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
9. The trademarks over which the companies sued were (in the order listed above) “North Face,”
“Mutual of Omaha,” “Louis Vuitton,” and the “New York Stock Exchange.”
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protected as a “parody.” And so the nature of words and their meaning
makes evaluating them difficult. Parodies are no exception.
The issue of what constitutes a parody in trademark law, and what
legal effect that finding should have, has been confusing courts for
decades. Before several recent attempts to tackle the issue of parody in
trademark law, 10 the last comprehensive attempt to do so occurred in a
law review article nearly twenty years ago. 11 Then, in 1994, there
seemed to be hope for clarity: the United States Supreme Court decided
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 12 There, the Court held that a
parodic use of a copyrighted work could qualify as a noninfringing fair
use. 13 Parody, the Court stated, was a form of comment or criticism that
ridicules the original work by, for example, mimicking its style. 14 It can
be distinguished from satire, which does not target the original work but
instead uses it as a vehicle to express some other (perhaps critical)
message. 15 The Court reasoned that parody had a greater claim to fair
use than satire. 16 Parodists require the original works to make their
comment or criticism. Satirists, on the other hand, have a weaker claim
because they are not commenting or criticizing directly the work they
use. Immediately, lower courts and commentators sought to apply and
criticize the Campbell decision both in copyright and trademark
contexts. 17
10. E.g., Stacey Dogan & Mark Lemley, Parody as Brand, __STAN. L. REV. __ (forthcoming
2013) (arguing that trademark parodies that use a mark without adopting it as a brand are
categorically not actionable, and then proposing using nominative fair use to evaluate parodies that
adopt the parodied mark as a brand); see also Bruce P. Keller & Rebecca Tushnet, Even More
Parodic than the Real Thing: Parody Lawsuits Revisited, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 979, 980 (2004).
11. Arlen W. Langvardt, Protected Marks and Protected Speech: Establishing the First
Amendment Boundaries in Trademark Parody Cases, 36 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1991).
12. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
13. Id. at 580–94. See, e.g., Keller & Tushnet, supra note 10, at 980 (“One of Campbell’s most
significant—and unsatisfying—effects has been to elevate parody as a favored form of literary or
artistic comment and devalue satire.”); id. at 983 (noting that Campbell elevated transformative uses
to a special status and included parody, but not satire, in that category).
14. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580.
15. Id. at 581.
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., infra Part II (detailing how courts have cited and incorporated Campbell into their
trademark analyses); 6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 31:156 (4th ed. 2012); Gary Meyers, Trademark Parody: Lessons from the
Copyright Decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 181,
204–10 (1996) (arguing that Campbell’s alteration of the fair use factors is instructive to trademark
law, and parody should similarly alter the confusion factors in trademark law). See also Aaron F.
Jaroff, Comment, Big Boi, Barbie, Dr. Seuss, and the King: Expanding the Constitutional
Protections for the Satirical Use of Famous Trademarks, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 641 (2008) (explaining
how concepts form Campbell have been incorporated into trademark law). The analogy between
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In a previous article, I explained how lower courts have applied
Campbell’s general holding—a parody is a use of the original work to
ridicule, criticize, or comment on it—in the copyright context. 18 What I
left out, however, was a discussion of parody in trademark law. This
omission was intentional: Campbell was a decision about copyright law,
and its implications for trademark law are uncertain.
This Article explores the gap left in my previous article, using
Campbell as a guide to examine the parody doctrine in trademark. It
argues that Campbell provides a few insights into parody that trademark
law should consider incorporating. At the same time, the decision
illustrates some pertinent differences between copyright and trademark
that suggest trademark law might need to clarify and expand its current
approach to parody. By collecting and analyzing all trademark cases that
cite Campbell, this Article presents evidence that courts treat trademark
and copyright parody claims similarly. It then questions whether this is a
wise legal choice. In the process, this Article argues the existing
dichotomy between likelihood of confusion and trademark defenses need
not be so rigid. Such an inflexible division misses the valuable role that
presumptions can play in analyzing trademark infringement claims
involving parody. By slightly adjusting trademark doctrine,
presumptions (and the other approaches advocated in this Article) can
simultaneously reduce the threat of frivolous lawsuits by trademark
owners and ensure legitimate claims against an infringer proceeds
without unnecessary hurdles. Thus, this Article argues that presumptions
and slight doctrinal adjustments can help adjust trademark law doctrine
to accommodate the legitimate interests of both parodists and trademark
owners.
The analysis, then, requires a comparison of parody and copyright and
trademark law. And this begins, of course, with the meaning of the term
“parody” itself. This starting point reveals, as the epigrams that begin
this Article demonstrate, that copyright and trademark define parody
similarly: both focus on how the parody both draws on and differentiates
itself from the original.
The next obvious point of comparison is the legal analysis each
regime uses to apply parody to its existing legal framework. Here

copyright and trademark parody analyses had been made prior to Campbell. See, e.g., Robert
J. Shaughnessy, Note, Trademark Parody: A Fair Use and First Amendment Analysis, 72 VA. L.
REV. 1079 (1986) (arguing that copyright fair uses and parody are relevant to parody analysis in
trademark law).
18. David A. Simon, Reasonable Perception and Parody in Copyright Law, 2010 UTAH L. REV.
779.
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differences emerge. In copyright, the parody analysis occurs after the
infringement analysis, as a defense. Parody in trademark law, by
contrast, operates during the infringement analysis. It is not, as courts
and commentators tell us, a real defense.19 Because parody comes into
play during the infringement analysis, the legal inquiry focuses on
trademark infringement’s staple concept: likelihood of confusion. Thus,
it seems natural for courts to ask whether consumers are likely to be
confused about the source of the parody’s product, 20 as infringement
occurs when consumers are likely to be confused over a product’s
source. 21 The analysis of confusion is factor based, with courts looking
to several factors, such as the similarity of the marks and marketing
channels, the distinctiveness of the senior user’s mark, and the user’s
intent. 22 Confusion, then, remains the watchword for parody analysis in
trademark law.
Perhaps trademark law’s focus on consumer confusion is unsurprising
given that preventing confusion is one of its main functions. Yet it is

19. 6 MCCARTHY, supra note 17, § 31:153 (noting that parody “is not an affirmative defense to an
infringement charge” but “[r]ather . . . a way of arguing that there will be no trademark infringement
because there will be no likelihood of confusion.”).
20. That said, the parody definition is not just a likelihood of confusion test. It has one further
element that makes it similar to the definition of parody laid out in Campbell. The parodic mark
must in some way associate itself with the original mark—it must use the original to show that it is
not the original. Throughout this Article, I refer to the “likelihood of confusion” test as “confusion”
or “infringement” for short hand. Thus, when I say “infringement” or “typical infringement” I do
not mean to include dilution actions.
21. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006) (creating a cause of action for false designation of origin
that is “likely to cause confusion . . . mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or
association . . . as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or
commercial activities by another person . . . .”); 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 17, § 23:1 (“‘Likelihood
of confusion’ is the basic test of both common-law trademark infringement and federal statutory
trade mark infringement.” (footnotes omitted)); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 17, §§ 3:8–3:9
(explaining that trademark law originally required products to emanate from a “physical source or
origin,” but has evolved to mean that “consumers [expect] all goods with the same mark to come
from a single, but anonymous or indistinguishable source . . . .”).
22. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 17, § 23:19 (explaining the factors listed by the RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 20–23 (1995), which include “1. The degree of resemblance
between the conflicting designations; 2. The similarity of the marketing methods and channels of
distribution; 3. The characteristics of the prospective purchasers and the degree of care they
exercise; 4. The degree of distinctiveness of the senior user’s mark; 5. Where the goods or services
are not competitive, the likelihood that prospective buyers would expect the senior user to expand
into the field of the junior user; 6. Where the goods or services are sold in different territories, the
extent to which the senior user’s designation is known in the junior user’s territory; 7. The intent of
the junior user; and 8. Evidence of actual confusion.”). See also GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & MARK
D. JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION: LAW AND POLICY 470–71 fig. 7.1 (2004)
(listing each circuit’s approach to the factor analysis and showing courts use between six and
thirteen factors to analyze likelihood of confusion).
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precisely this emphasis on confusion that raises questions about the
parody doctrine itself. Parody is supposed to be a doctrine that insulates
expressive speech from overzealous trademark owners. If instead it is
merely a restated confusion test, then parody protects only so much
speech as trademark law traditionally allows. That is odd for at least two
reasons. First, it is superfluous for a legal doctrine to exist without
having some effect. For this reason, the presence and recognition of the
doctrine suggests that it is doing some extra work that trademark law
cannot alone handle. Second, parody is a recognized doctrine in
copyright law. And here the effects of the doctrine are quite strong. 23
Copyright and trademark law often cover—and claims are frequently
brought regarding—the same objects. As a result, we have reason to
think that parody may operate similarly in both legal regimes.
Yet on these facts, it is unclear whether parody is superfluous in
trademark, or whether parody in practice operates similarly (in terms of
outcome) in copyright and trademark. Using Campbell as a copyright
lens, this Article analyzes this issue. First, this Article asks how courts
citing Campbell have applied the parody doctrine in trademark law. If
the commentators’ conception of trademark parody is correct, we should
find that courts merely restate the confusion tests in their parody analysis
of trademark claims. The cases show that this is only partially true.
Although most courts rely on the confusion test, few apply it without
considering the parodic nature of the defendant’s mark; parody, in other
words, frequently influences how courts apply the confusion test. Yet,
despite the diversity of methods used to analyze parody, not all are
equally desirable. Some, however, provide valuable insights into what a
better standard for parody might look like. The most promising approach
appears in Rogers v. Grimaldi, 24 in which the court held that titular
parody of a trademark in an expressive work was entitled to a
presumption of fairness. 25
Although the lessons from Rogers and the other parody cases help
describe the doctrinal tests, they do nothing to explain the relationship
between copyright and trademark claims involving parody. To examine
this relationship within the context of parody, Campbell again proves a
useful way in. By focusing on cases that cite Campbell, this Article
examines how courts have treated copyright and trademark claims when
they appear in the same dispute. These cases show that trademark and

23. See generally Simon, supra note 18.
24. 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
25. Id. at 1004–05.
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copyright claims are directly related. Of the fifteen cases involving
copyright and trademark dilution claims, courts decided those claims
identically 100% of the time. The same was true for all of the twentytwo cases involving copyright and trademark infringement claims. Put
another way, in every case in which a court found copyright
infringement, it also found trademark dilution and/or infringement.
Likewise, in every case where the court found no copyright infringement
existed, it also found that no trademark dilution or confusion existed.
This provides evidence that copyright and trademark claims are related
in parody cases.
Given this relationship, it seems likely that Campbell, its analysis, and
its definition of parody are all shaping the way in which courts apply
parody to trademark law. But should they be? Campbell, after all, was a
copyright dispute—and copyright and trademark law are two different
legal regimes calibrated to different sets of interests and goals. Their
different features, both legal and normative, might make copyright and
trademark law awkward bedfellows in the parody context. By analyzing
some differences between copyright and trademark, we find the answer
to the question above is both yes and no. The answer is yes because
Campbell casts parody as a defense that protects expressive speech. The
answer is no because Campbell is too narrow when applied to the
infringement or dilution analyses in trademark law. This is particularly
true in light of the expanding scope of trademark law and the noticeable
dearth of trademark defenses. Thus, this Article proposes using
Campbell to refine courts’ approaches to parody in trademark law.
Drawing on all of the foregoing analysis, this Article proposes two
new tests for parody in trademark law—one for infringement and one for
dilution. For infringement, the proposed test presumes parodies are
noninfringing. The plaintiff can rebut that presumption by showing that
a direct competitor sells the parodic product, and the product competes
directly with the plaintiff’s goods or services. If the plaintiff succeeds,
the court should evaluate the parody using a modified version of
likelihood of confusion factors. In the dilution context, this Article
proposes treating parody as “noncommercial,” expanding the statutory
exemption to dilution under the Lanham Act to cover uses that qualify as
“as a mark.” Each of these tests uses a definition of parody more
expansive than the one laid out in Campbell. That is, “parody” includes
satirical uses of trademarks.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I sets the table for the
subsequent discussion. It examines and evaluates how courts have
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decided confusion and dilution questions when parody is involved.
Although the discussion primarily focuses on published cases 26 that cite
Campbell, it includes other cases as well. Next, Part II takes us in three
interrelated directions. First, we evaluate how courts citing Campbell
resolve trademark and copyright parody claims in the same case. Using
Campbell as a lens, this Article then explores the differences between
copyright and trademark law. Finally, we determine what aspects of
Campbell should be incorporated into a parody trademark doctrine. With
a broad framework for trademark parody in view, Part III suggests two
new defenses for parody—one for infringement and one for dilution.
I.

THE CURRENT PARODY DOCTRINE IN TRADEMARK LAW

Parody analysis in trademark law has nuances that it lacks in
copyright law. In copyright, parody shades the borders of the fair use
defense, usually coloring the inquiry with a hue of fairness. In
trademark, though, the story is complicated by courts’ analytical
techniques: although some courts use parody as a defense to
infringement, most use parody to shade the infringement analysis. In this
Part, I taxonomize each analytical approach courts take when resolving a
traditional infringement (confusion) or dilution claim involving parody.
Most—but not all—of these cases I analyze cite Campbell, for reasons I
mentioned earlier. At the same time, I analyze these approaches, asking
questions about their ability to adequately protect speech interests and
trademark owners’ rights. From this analysis I develop suggestions for
how courts should address parody in trademark infringement and
dilution claims.
A.

Approaches to Trademark Infringement Actions Involving Parody

It turns out that, once courts find that a parody exists, they employ a
variety of methods to determine whether and how that finding bears on
the issue of confusion. Taking a certain approach can be determinative
of infringement. Thus, it matters a great deal how courts approach the
application of the parody finding. We start with the six approaches in
cases citing Campbell. 27 After this tour, we make two more stops,
focusing on a few cases that did not cite Campbell.
26. “Published” here means reported in Westlaw’s database.
27. The Appendix explains exactly how I obtained the trademark parody cases citing Campbell.
For now it’s sufficient to note that I included only decisions in the database Westlaw retrieved when
retrieving cases “citing” Campbell. Thus, if Westlaw’s database does not include all decisions citing
Campbell, then my sample is not the entire universe of cases.
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Parody Approaches in Infringement Cases Citing Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose

Courts citing Campbell use six different approaches to analyzing
infringement claims that involve parodies. One method is the Infusion
Approach, which uses a parody finding to alter how courts apply the
traditional likelihood of confusion factors. Parody, in this category,
narrows the scope of the confusion analysis. Second, courts use a
Balancing Test when parody is at issue. The third approach does not
require courts to alter their analyses at all; rather, it requires courts to
apply the standard likelihood of confusion analysis. Under the fourth
approach, courts treat parody as a form of Nominative Fair Use. Fifth,
courts use the Alterative Means Approach, which asks whether the
defendant could have made her point without using the plaintiff’s
trademark. Finally, some courts use the Separate Digit Approach, which
characterizes parody as separate factor in the likelihood of confusion
analysis.
As Table 1 shows, the majority of courts (53%) use the Infusion
Approach. The next most popular approach is a Balancing Test, with
23% of courts using this method. A standard Confusion Test came in
third, with 8% of courts using it. The last 16% of cases used three
methods: 8% use Nominative Fair Use; 4% use an Alternative Means
Test; and another 4% use a test that analyzes parody as a Separate Digit
in the confusion analysis.
TABLE 1. APPROACHES TO TRADEMARK PARODY IN
INFRINGEMENT CASES CITING CAMPBELL V. ACUFF-ROSE
Parody Approach
Times Used
%
Infusion
14
53%
Balancing/Rogers
6
23%
Confusion
2
8%
Nominative Fair Use
2*
8%
Alternative Means
1
4%
Separate Digit
1
4%
Total

26

100%

* One case, Mattel v. Walking Mountain Productions, also used a nominative
fair use analysis to evaluate a parody trade dress claim. This was counted in
both categories, which explains the total number of uses at 26, even though
there are only 25 cases in the sample.

Raw numbers, of course, do not explain the benefits of any particular
approach. That information comes only from examining each one.
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The Infusion Approach

Some courts take the view that parody is not an affirmative defense,
“but merely a way of phrasing the traditional response that customers are
not likely to be confused as to the source, sponsorship or approval.” 28
This approach—the most dominant in the cases I examined—weaves a
finding of parody into the analysis of the confusion factors. 29 In some
ways, it resembles how a parody finding in copyright affects the fair use
inquiry. 30 Typically, a finding of parody will swing in the parodist’s
favor certain traditional confusion factors: the strength of the mark, 31 the
degree of similarity between the two marks, 32 the defendant’s intent, 33
product similarity, 34 and, to a lesser extent, actual confusion 35 and
28. Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1405 (9th Cir. 1997)
(citing Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 648 F. Supp. 905, 910 (D. Neb. 1986), aff’d, 836 F.2d
397 (8th Cir. 1987)).
29. E.g., Utah Lighthouse Ministry v. Found. for Apologetic Info. & Research, 527 F.3d 1045,
1057 (10th Cir. 2008); Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC (Louis Vuitton II),
507 F.3d 252, 258–59 (4th Cir. 2007); Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497,
502 (2d Cir. 1996); CCA & B, LLC v. F + W Media Inc., 819 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1324 (N.D. Ga.
2011); Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1335–38 (N.D. Ga. 2008); World
Wrestling Fed’n Entm’t Inc. (WWE) v. Big Dog Holdings, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d 413, 430–40 (W.D.
Pa. 2003); Charles Atlas, Ltd. v. DC Comics, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 330, 337–40 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(applying modified Rogers test from Cliffs Notes by assessing the expressive value of the
defendant’s work and then walking through the likelihood of confusion factors as colored by a
finding of parody with expressive value). See also New York Stock Exch., Inc. v. New York, New
York Hotel LLC, 293 F.3d 550, 555–56 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that use of modified versions of
New York Stock Exchange marks on a casino in Las Vegas that replicated parts of New York City
was parodic and noninfringing, and using the nature of the parody to inform the analysis of the
strength of the mark); Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Grp., Inc., 886 F.2d 490,
493–94 (2d Cir. 1989) (applying a variation of the Rogers test to parody).
30. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 18, at 821–37. There is an important difference here. Fair use is a
doctrine that evaluates a use independent of the infringement analysis. That is, the court analyzes
fair use only if the work infringes the plaintiff’s copyright. Under the Infusion Approach, however,
parody shapes the infringement analysis; it is not a defense to infringement. This is an important
point, as we shall see, because it accentuates why the Infusion Approach alone is inadequate.
31. Louis Vuitton II, 507 F.3d at 261–62; Hormel Foods, 73 F.3d at 503; WWE, 280 F. Supp. 2d
at 435; Charles Atlas, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 340–41.
32. Louis Vuitton II, 507 F.3d at 262; Hormel Foods, 73 F.3d at 503–04; WWE, 280 F. Supp. 2d
at 432–35; Charles Atlas, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 340–41.
33. Louis Vuitton II, 507 F.3d at 263; Hormel Foods, 73 F.3d at 505; WWE, 280 F. Supp. 2d at
438; Charles Atlas, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 340.
34. Louis Vuitton II, 507 F.3d at 260–62 (describing how differences in products—the
defendant’s dog toys versus the plaintiff’s luxury goods—illustrated parody).
35. Charles Atlas, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 340 (“The fact that Atlas claims not to have noticed until
seven years later ‘is a strong indicator that the [Flex Mentallo character] did not create a significant
likelihood of confusion because [DC] was successful in conveying that the reference to [Atlas] was
a [parody], and not a source identifier.’” (quoting Yankee Publ’g Inc. v. News Am. Publ’g Inc., 809
F. Supp. 267, 274–75 (S.D.N.Y. 1992))).
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consumer sophistication. 36
Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC (Louis
Vuitton II), 37 is a good illustration of how a finding of parody colors the
confusion factors. At issue in that case were the defendant’s dog toys
called “Chewy Vuiton,” which mimicked the plaintiff’s mark, “Louis
Vuitton,” under which the plaintiff sold luxury clothing and accessories
(including dog accessories). 38 The court first made an initial inquiry into
whether a parody existed, 39 much like Campbell instructed lower courts
to do in copyright parody cases. 40 After finding a parody, the court
evaluated the factors with this finding in mind. 41
The court expressly discussed parody in relation to four factors. First,
it noted parody was important in weighing the strength of the marks. 42
While a strong mark will usually favor the plaintiff, “the opposite may
be true when a legitimate claim of parody is involved.”43 This is because
the parody needs to use a strong mark to be recognized as a parody; a
weak mark would not likely be recognized as a parody. 44 Because a
mark is strong, the court reasoned, consumers know that the parody is
not the original. 45 Applying this framework to the mark at issue, the
court found this factor favored the defendant.
Second, the court then explained that parody influenced its analysis of
the marks’ similarity. 46 Indeed, what makes a parody qua parody is its
ability to be similar enough to the original to evoke it and comment on
it. 47 This factor also favored the defendant because “[the defendant]
appropriately mimicked a part of the LVM marks, but at the same time
sufficiently distinguished its own product to communicate the satire.” 48
36. Hormel Foods, 73 F.3d at 505.
37. 507 F.3d 252. This case did not discuss Campbell in the trademark section of the case.
Nevertheless, its use of parody to alter the confusion analysis is illustrative of the Infusion
Approach.
38. Id. at 257–58.
39. Id. at 260.
40. Simon, supra note 18, at 782.
41. Louis Vuitton II, 507 F.3d at 261–64.
42. Id. at 261–62.
43. Id. at 261.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 261–62. This is similar to the Campbell Court’s statement that parodies need to use
well-known, expressive works to be effective. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S.
569 (1994).
46. Louis Vuitton II, 507 F.3d at 262.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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The court also examined, thirdly, the defendant’s intent, finding that
the intent to parody “neutralized” this factor. 49 Rather than evidencing
bad faith, “the intent [to parody] is to do just the opposite—to evoke a
humorous, satirical association that distinguishes the products.” 50
Finally, the court found the dissimilarity in products—was important in
the parody analysis—weighed against a finding of confusion. 51 Overall,
the court found that the factors favored the defendant, and that “Haute
Diggity Dog’s marketing, sale, and distribution of ‘Chewy Vuiton’ dog
toys [were] [not] likely to cause confusion . . .[because the toys were] an
obvious parody.” 52
Louis Vuitton II is not alone in using this test. Indeed, the Infusion
Approach dominates the Campbell cases. Aside from being popular, this
approach has some benefits. To some extent, it accounts for First
Amendment considerations by altering the infringement analysis. When
the court examines the similarity of the marks, for example, a parody can
neutralize a factor that would otherwise weigh in favor of the plaintiff.
This is similar to how Campbell treated parody with respect to section
107(2), 53 which asks what kind of work the defendant used. 54 Although
highly expressive works typically receive more protection than factual
ones, Campbell held that parodies must use highly expressive works;
therefore, the defendant’s use of a highly expressive work would not
weigh in the plaintiff’s favor. 55 In both cases, First Amendment concerns
alter how courts apply infringement (for trademark) and fair use (for
copyright) factors.
Because the parody finding just alters the application of the
infringement factors, it provides the First Amendment less weight than it
could; instead, it simply finds that the work is not confusing. 56 This
becomes even clearer when one considers that these “altered” factors
still may not tip the balance of parody in favor of noninfringement. 57
49. Id. at 263.
50. Id. (emphasis in original).
51. Id. at 260–62.
52. Id. at 263.
53. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994).
54. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2006) (stating as the second fair use factor “the nature of the copyrighted
work”).
55. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
56. McCarthy characterizes parody this way too. 6 MCCARTHY, supra note 17, § 31:153 (“A
parody of a trademark is not an affirmative defense to an infringement charge in the sense that
laches or the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense. Rather, ‘parody’ is a way of arguing
that there will be no trademark infringement because there will be no likelihood of confusion.”).
57. E.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994).
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Indeed, the Infusion Approach is not a defense at all, as commentators
repeatedly acknowledge. 58 Thus, speech interests get shorter shrift under
this approach than they would under a defense to infringement.
b.

Parody as First Amendment Balancing

First Amendment jurisprudence often resorts to ad hoc balancing,
weighing various interests against each other.59 Because parody
implicates First Amendment concerns, some courts have used a
Balancing Approach to resolve trademark claims that involve parody.
Although the first court to use this approach (Rogers v. Grimadli) did so
prior to Campbell, it is important to review because post-Campbell cases
have also used variants of the Rogers test in their analysis. In Rogers, the
court applied a Balancing Approach to resolve a trademark infringement
claim involving the title of a movie. 60 “[I]n general,” the court wrote,
“the [Lanham] Act should be construed to apply to artistic works only
where the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the
public interest in free expression.” 61 When the titular use of a mark
included a celebrity’s name, free expression would win “unless the title
has no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has
some artistic relevance, unless the title explicitly misleads as to the
source or the content of the work.” 62
Subsequent cases citing Campbell have followed and modified this
approach, making it less speech friendly. 63 In Cliffs Notes, Inc. v.
Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 64 for example, the court
stated that “in deciding the reach of the Lanham Act in any case where
an expressive work is alleged to infringe a trademark, it is appropriate to
weigh the public interest in free expression against the public interest in
58. See supra note 19.
59. E.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 970 (10th Cir.
1996) (“[P]roof of trademark infringement under the Lanham Act requires proof of a likelihood of
confusion, but, in the case of a good trademark parody, there is little likelihood of confusion, since
the humor lies in the difference between the original and the parody.”); World Wrestling Fed’n
Entm’t Inc. (WWE) v. Big Dog Holdings, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d 413, 431 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (“Parody,
therefore, is not an affirmative defense, but only another factor to be considered in determining the
likelihood of confusion. Whether a customer is confused is the ultimate question.” (footnote
omitted)).
60. Rogers v. Grimadli, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Grp., Inc., 886 F.2d 490 (2d
Cir. 1989).
64. Id.
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avoiding consumer confusion.” 65 But in applying the test, 66 the court fell
back into the confusion trap, concluding: “we do not believe that there is
a likelihood that an ordinarily prudent purchaser would think that [the
defendant’s work,] Spy Notes[,] is actually a study guide produced by
[the defendant], as opposed to a parody of [the plaintiff’s work,] Cliffs
Notes.” 67
Both cases illustrate the benefits and drawbacks of the Balancing
Approach. Although balancing is often criticized as too vague to be
protective, 68 Rogers puts a free expression thumb on the infringement
scale. Under Rogers, any expressive element will probably immunize a
title from trademark infringement. Exceptions include titles that attempt
to deceive—such as calling an unauthorized biography “an authorized
biography.” 69
But balancing also has its drawbacks. Because the Rogers court had to
hedge its bets, it allowed some infringement claims to go forward where
the title was “explicitly misleading,” an inquiry that could be resolved
only through contextual analysis. 70 But even more importantly,
balancing often provides cover for old confusion memes to thrive. This
is what happened in Cliffs Notes. There, the court found convincing the
Rogers balancing approach but, in attempting to apply it, the court
merely turned to an infusion-style likelihood of confusion assessment
(without using the factors). 71
So, if we are trying to learn from these approaches, the Balancing
65. Id. at 494.
66. Id. at 495 (“[T]aking into account that somewhat more risk of confusion is to be tolerated
when a trademark holder seeks to enjoin artistic expression such as a parody, the degree of risk of
confusion between Spy Notes and Cliffs Notes does not outweigh the well-established public
interest in parody.”).
67. Id.
68. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Reconciling Trademark Rights and Expressive Values: How to
Stop Worrying and Learn to Love Ambiguity, in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 261, 282 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., 2008)
(“Balancing tests are notoriously unpredictable, making it risky for anyone who is contemplating an
investment in expressive use. Thus, although there are not many U.S. cases that reach the
constitutional issue, the few cases decided on that ground are difficult to reconcile.”); William
McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 49, 100–01 (2008) (criticizing the
Rogers test for, among other things, being an unclear and fact-intensive standard).
69. Rogers v. Grimadli, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989) (“Other titles contain words explicitly
signifying endorsement, such as the phrase in a subtitle ‘an authorized biography.’ If such explicit
references were used in a title and were false as applied to the underlying work, the consumer’s
interest in avoiding deception would warrant application of the Lanham Act, even if the title had
some relevance to the work.”).
70. Id.
71. Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 494–97.
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Approach teaches us that presumptions are important, as are grounded,
understandable standards and rules to apply should the presumption fail.
Any First Amendment test must, therefore, incorporate some kind of
strong presumption for speech interests, or else it risks fostering the
growth of the confusion-centered memes.
c.

Confusion

Although the Infusion and Balancing Approaches are popular, others
exist. One such approach is not really a parody analysis at all. Instead,
courts apply the likelihood of confusion in the standard way. As in
MasterCard International Inc. v. Nader 2000, 72 courts never include a
discussion of how parody alters the analysis. 73 Although its copyright
analysis included a discussion of parody, the court’s trademark analysis
did not mention parody. Ultimately, the court found no confusion based
on the dissimilarities of the nature, purpose, and use of the mark by
Ralph Nader’s campaign for political purposes. 74
As far as speech-protective tests go, this one is far from ideal. It does
not expressly account for any speech-related interests 75 (such as those of
the speaker and the listener). Instead, it relies on the standard likelihood
of confusion analysis. But the whole point of having a parody doctrine is
to recognize that important interests besides confusion are at stake.
When a use makes fun of or criticizes the mark (or some other issue), the
First Amendment cautions against (private) censorship. Using a standard
likelihood of confusion analysis does not account for these interests.
Mark similarity, intent of the parties, and product similarity, for
example, cut in favor of the mark owner in such cases. In parody cases,
by contrast, they do not. Proposals to use a standard confusion analysis
miss this very basic point. 76 For this and other reasons discussed later,

72. No. 00 Civ.6068(GBD), 2004 WL 434404 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2004).
73. Id.
74. Id. The trademarks at issues were, “THERE ARE SOME THINGS MONEY CAN’T BUY.
FOR EVERYTHING ELSE THERE’S MASTERCARD,” and “PRICELESS.” Id. at *2. Nader used
the phrases, “finding out the truth: priceless. There are some things money can’t buy.” Id. at *1.
75. See McGeveran, supra note 68, at 71 (noting the confusion test fails “to address the normative
value of free speech”).
76. See Eric Sonju, “Likelihood of Confusion” is Confusing Enough: Why the Concept of Parody
has No Place in a Likelihood of Confusion Analysis, 38 AIPLA Q.J. 349, 361–62 (2010) (arguing
without explaining that “[p]arody should not be an additional factor in the likelihood of confusion
test, . . . affect the application of the existing factors . . . . [or] be used to justify greater risk of
confusion out of concern for freedom of expression under the First Amendment.”); Tammi A.
Gauthier, Comment, Fun & Profit: When Commercial Parodies Constitute Copyright or Trademark
Infringement, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 165, 203–04 (1993) (arguing that courts should determine trademark
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the confusion test is inadequate.
d.

Parody as Nominative Fair Use

Another approach—one taken by the court in Mattel, Inc. v. Walking
Mountain Productions 77—analyzes parody under the judicially created
doctrine of nominative fair use. 78 This doctrine applies where the
defendant uses the plaintiff’s mark to refer to the plaintiff’s mark,
generally for comparison or criticism. 79 So, for example, where an
advertisement says, “Try our Product X. It has more ingredients than
comparable Product Y®,” nominative fair use would apply.
Nominative fair use, which replaces or supplements the factor-based
confusion test, requires the plaintiff to show three elements. 80 First, the
plaintiff’s product or service in question must be one not readily
identifiable without use of the trademark. Second, only so much of the
mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify the
plaintiff’s product or service. And third, the user must not use the mark
in a way that suggests sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark
holder.
The Walking Mountain court applied this three-part test in the parody
context as to trade dress. 81 In that case, the defendant had created a
photography exhibit that used various Barbie dolls posing in sexually
suggestive positions with food. 82 The court found that the defendant
satisfied the first element of the nominative fair use doctrine, noting that
it would have been “extremely difficult” to comment on the image of
Barbie without using the image of Barbie. 83 As to the second element,

infringement of commercial parodies by asking whether there is confusion in marketplace).
77. 353 F.3d 792, 809 (9th Cir. 2003).
78. E.g., id. (applying nominative fair use to the trade dress claim). Although the Mattel court
applied the Rogers test to the confusion analysis of the trademark at issue, it did not do so for the
trade dress at issue. Id. at 807–08. This way the court avoided deciding whether Rogers applied by
applying the nominative fair use doctrine instead. Id. at 808.
79. Id. at 809 (“In contrast, a defendant’s use of a plaintiff’s mark is nominative where he or she
‘used the plaintiff’s mark to describe the plaintiff’s product, even if the defendant’s ultimate goal is
to describe his own product.’ The goal of a nominative use is generally for the ‘purposes of
comparison, criticism [or] point of reference.’” (emphasis in original) (citations and footnote
omitted)).
80. Id. at 810 (describing the three elements of nominative fair use (quoting Cairns v. Franklin
Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1151 (9th Cir. 2002))).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 796–97.
83. Id. at 810–11.
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the court found that the defendant satisfied this fact-intensive 84 inquiry. 85
Using Barbie’s torso and body to comment on the sexuality of Barbie,
the court found, was no more than reasonably necessary. 86 Finally, the
court found the last element was satisfied, dubbing it a “closer call” than
the first two. 87 This element, the court noted, does not require the
defendant to use the mark to affirmatively endorse the product or service
at issue. Nevertheless, the court focused on what the defendant did to
reduce the risk that individuals would suspect endorsement. Important to
the court were the promotional materials that the defendant distributed
with his work, which included statements that the defendant’s aim was
to criticize the work. 88 Critical commentaries, the court stated, were not
likely to be sponsored by the trademark owner. 89 For these reasons, this
was nominative fair use.
Although seemingly a good candidate for a parody defense,
nominative fair use faces at least two conceptual deficiencies. First,
asking whether the defendant satisfied the third element—does the use
suggest sponsorship or endorsement?—is a lot like asking whether
consumers would be confused about the source of the product or
service. 90 In other words, the sponsorship/endorsement question is
essentially the same question the confusion analysis seeks to answer,
though framed in slightly different terms. 91
84. Id. at 811 (“As we recognized in Cairns, ‘[w]hat is ‘reasonably necessary to identify the
plaintiff’s product’ differs from case to case.’” (quoting Cairns, 292 F.3d at 1151)).
85. Id.
86. Id. (“Given the photographic medium and Forsythe’s goal of representing the social
implications of Barbie, including issues of sexuality and body image, Forsythe’s use of the Barbie
torso and head is both reasonable and necessary.”).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 811–12.
89. Id. at 812.
90. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Lewis & Clark Law School Ninth Distinguished IP Lecture:
Developing Defenses in Trademark Law, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 99, 111 (2009) (“[T]he third
part of the test looks very much [like] a proxy for an assessment of likely confusion as to
association, sponsorship or endorsement.”); Samuel M. Duncan, Note, Protecting Nominative Fair
Use, Parody, and Other Speech-Interests by Reforming the Inconsistent Exemptions from
Trademark Liability, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 219, 239 (2010) (“Further, as in nominative fair use,
in infringement cases the doctrine is, at its base, not that parody is protected speech, but that, if
understood correctly, parodic speech is not likely to cause confusion.” (emphasis added)).
91. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 17, § 23:11 (“‘[N]ominative fair use’ was created to be an
alternative method for analyzing if there is the kind of likelihood of confusion that constitutes
trademark infringement.”); id. (“[T]he ‘nominative fair use’ analysis is a ‘defense’ only in the sense
that an accused infringer in certain cases can use the analysis to argue that there will be no
infringement because there will be no likelihood of confusion.”). But see id. (arguing that, “in the
Third Circuit, ‘nominative fair use’ is indeed an affirmative defense. In its Century 21 case, the
Third Circuit took the thinking behind the Ninth Circuit analysis and turned it into a much more
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Not all agree on this point. Stacey Dogan and Mark Lemley, for
example, assert that nominative fair use contextualizes the inquiry in a
way standard confusion analysis does not. 92 They argue it requires the
court to “assess how the use measures up against” the purpose for which
the mark is used. 93 The confusion analysis, by contrast, is focused
entirely on whether consumers are likely to be confused about the source
or sponsorship of the mark.
It is not, however, entirely true that in the confusion analysis—at least
as to parody—“the factfinder has no purpose against which to measure
the nature of the use.” 94 As this Article demonstrates, courts repeatedly
use parody as a way to shift the likelihood of confusion analysis. Under
the Infusion Approach, for example, parody can alter the way courts
apply the confusion factors. In such cases, courts apply those factors
against the backdrop of parody and, consequently, its purpose.
Additionally, it is not clear how merely having parody as a backdrop in
the Nominative Fair Use Approach makes the inquiry into consumer
perceptions any easier than it would be in another mode of analysis, such
as the Infusion Approach. Indeed, the Infusion Approach achieves a
similar goal with a more nuanced set of factors to apply.
Second, some courts have held that nominative fair use applies only
when the defendant uses the plaintiff’s mark exactly (or nearly
exactly). 95 This, of course, makes some sense, particularly if we import
Campbell’s requirement that a parody comment on the underlying mark.
But even if we take that position, it seems odd to require near identity to
avoid infringement. If the mark is not identical—or even closely
similar—then consumers will not be confused about the source.96 All the
more reason to allow parodies with non-identical marks—particularly if
parody itself cannot overcome consumer confusion (or
sponsorship/endorsement).

potent defensive tool.”).
92. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 10, at 37–38.
93. Id. at 38.
94. Id.
95. E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1032–34 (C.D. Cal.
2006) (holding that the nominative fair use defense was not available to the defendant’s video game
rendition of the plaintiff’s strip club because the defendant did not design the strip club in the video
game to resemble plaintiff’s actual strip club, and stating that “because the [defendant’s] Game does
not specifically identify the [plaintiff’s strip club] as such, the elements of the [nominative fair use
defense] cannot readily be applied.”).
96. Marks that are not closely similar, and thus fall outside the scope of nominative fair use, may
still refer to the plaintiff’s mark. To the extent that nominative fair use would not cover such
instances when they involve parody, it would be unhelpful.
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The nominative fair use defense therefore seems particularly
inadequate for parodic or satirical uses of trademarks. First Amendment
interests are difficult to locate where the analysis resembles the
traditional likelihood of confusion test. Instead of a real defense, the
doctrine of nominative fair use is a recasting of the likelihood of
confusion test; it is a confusion trap. For these reasons, nominative fair
use does not adequately protect First Amendment interests.
e.

Alternative Means Approach

Occasionally, a court will apply an Alternative Means Approach and
hold that a defendant is liable for infringement where she could have
made her statement without using the mark in a confusing manner. One
mark user, for example, told the story of the O.J. Simpson murder trial
using some of Dr. Seuss’ trademarks. 97 The court found the likelihood of
confusion factors weighed in favor of infringement. As to what it called
a “Possible First Amendment Defense,” the court found none existed.
Here, it adopted the Alternative Means Approach, which “dismisses
First Amendment concerns where ‘alternative avenues of
communication’ exist that might have been selected by the infringer to
convey its message.” 98 The court found its fair use analysis of the
copyright claim adequately captured the “alternative means” approach as
applied to trademark claim: the defendant can take only so much as
necessary for the use, and no more. For the court, the use of the
trademarks was clearly satire, not parody. As such, the defendant could
have used alternative means to comment on the O.J. Simpson trial, as the
criticism and comment of it were not directed at Dr. Seuss’ trademarks. 99
Practically speaking, this approach is not different from the confusion
analysis. 100 But theoretically, it is actually much worse. Under this test,
97. Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc. (Dr. Seuss I), 924 F. Supp. 1559 (S.D.
Cal. 1996).
98. Id. at 1571 (quoting Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d
200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979)); id. (“The Court feels that the weight of Supreme Court authority indicates
that it would favor adoption of the first approach as adequately accommodating the narrow
instances when trademark protection cannot be viewed as a reasonable time, place, or manner
restriction.”).
99. Id. at 1569 (finding on the copyright claim that the nature, character, and purpose of the
defendant’s use of the central character illustration of The Cat in the Hat and the central rhyme in
Horton Hatches the Egg weighed against fair use, but also that defendant could not justify taking
the central character illustration from The Cat in the Hat, yet the defendant could justify its taking
from Horton Hatches the Egg and One Fish Two Fish Red Fish Blue Fish); id. at 1571 (finding that
a First Amendment defense for the trademark claim was unlikely to succeed based on the Court’s
copyright analysis).
100. Id. at 1573. Indeed, the court itself suggested that the confusion analysis is the only relevant
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the court purports to account for the First Amendment, but, in actuality,
it subjugates that interest to the confusion doctrine. There will always be
“alternative means of achieving a satirical or parodic ends”101 that do not
entail confusion. Much of the problem is rooted in a strict, but inapt,
analogy to real property 102: trademarks are used to make speech that
includes a statement about them; real property is used merely
instrumentally to speak from some place. Yet courts treat trademarks as
a location (i.e., as a parcel of real property) rather than as speech itself.
So they conclude that the defendant has no need to use the trademark
when she can always say what she wants some other way. In other
words, why stand on the plaintiff’s mark to shout about the O.J. Simpson
trial? Why not stand on some unowned parcel of land? Of course, this
misses the important point that trademarks themselves are not merely
owned “property,” but also speech itself. This conclusion, however,
coupled with the express rejection of First Amendment interests, makes
the Alternative Means Approach inadequate. It, too, is a confusion trap.
f.

Parody as a Separate Factor or Digit

Another way courts use parody is to weigh it as a separate “digit” in
the confusion analysis. 103 In other words, courts tack on the parody
finding as something else to be weighed when determining likelihood of
confusion. 104 The problem with this approach is that it completely
ignores how parody affects the likelihood of confusion factors. 105 This is
what happened in Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. Capece (Elvis
Presley II). 106 There, though, the court actually made a substantive
finding about parody, rather than apply a parody test. It held that,
although the defendant’s mark was a parody, it was not a parody of the

inquiry: “Where alternative means of achieving the satiric or parodic ends exist that would not entail
consumer confusion, the First Amendment will not protect the parodist from being held to infringe.”
Id. (footnote omitted).
101. Id.
102. Michael K. Cantwell, Confusion, Dilution, and Speech: First Amendment Limitations on the
Trademark State, 87 TRADEMARK REP. 547, 555–56 (1997).
103. Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece (Elvis Presley II), 141 F.3d 188, 200 n.5 (5th Cir. 1998)
(“We have considered parody separately from the other digits of confusion and recommend this
approach, but in no way do we suggest at this time that the district court’s approach of considering
parody within its analysis of the standard digits of confusion in itself constitutes reversible error.”).
104. Id. at 194 (“Parody is one such other relevant factor that a court may consider in a
likelihood-of-confusion analysis.”).
105. See infra Part III.A.1.a.
106. 141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1998).
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plaintiff’s mark. 107 Therefore, the court said, the defendant did not need
to use the plaintiff’s mark for the parody. 108 In this sense, the court’s
analysis resembled lessons from both Campbell (a need to target the
mark itself) and from Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books USA,
Inc. (Dr. Seuss I) 109 (a lack of alternative means of communicating the
message). The court noted that “[the restaurant owner] himself conceded
that the Defendants could have performed their parody without using
Elvis’s name. Without the necessity to use Elvis’s name, parody does
not weigh against a likelihood of confusion in relation to [the plaintiff’s]
marks.” 110 Under this approach, the concept of parody not only fails to
save the defendant, “[i]t is simply irrelevant.” 111
This approach shares the same pitfalls as the Infusion and Alternative
Means Approaches, but enjoys none of their benefits. As an initial
matter, it seeks to divorce parody from the confusion analysis by making
it a separate factor to be weighed. That, of course, neglects the nature of
a parody and how it can influence the confusion analysis. But even
worse, the Separate Digit Approach breaks down into an Alternative
Means Approach that is not itself a defense. At least the Alternative
Means Approach purported to be a defense to infringement (though it is
not). And the standard could actually excuse the use in some cases: if
“no alternative means” actually existed (though this is a tight standard),
the parodist is not liable. Here, the test is merely a factor in the
confusion analysis. Thus, even if a parody exists (and no alternative
means exist), then theoretically infringement could still occur. Once
again, we find ourselves in a confusion trap.
2.

Other Approaches to Parody in Trademark Infringement Claims

Although there are twenty-three trademark cases citing Campbell,
there are many more trademark cases involving parody. Within these
cases two other parody tests exist. We explore those here. First, we
107. Id. at 199–200.
108. Id. at 200 (“The Defendants’ parody of the faddish bars of the sixties does not require the
use of EPE’s marks because it does not target Elvis Presley; therefore, the necessity to use the
marks significantly decreases and does not justify the use.”). The Elvis court’s approach was later
abrogated by a subsequent Fifth Circuit opinion, Lyons P’ship v. Giannoulas (Giannoulas II), 179
F.3d 384, 389 (5th Cir. 1999). Although the Giannoulas II court rejected the narrow reading of the
Elvis court’s decision, it followed a similar analysis of the parody issue, requiring the defendant to
reference the plaintiff’s mark in some way. Id. at 388. It must do this, however, while
simultaneously distinguishing itself as something other than the original. Id.
109. 924 F. Supp. 1559 (S.D. Cal. 1996), aff’d, 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
110. Elvis Presley II, 141 F.3d at 200.
111. Id.
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examine courts that characterized parody as a per se Affirmative
Defense. Then we explore the initial interest confusion doctrine,
focusing on parodic uniform resource locators (URLs).
a.

Parody as a Per Se First Amendment Defense

The least traditional approach has been to use a finding of parody as
determinative of First Amendment protection. 112 In GTFM, LLC v.
Universal Studios, Inc., 113 the defendant had created a movie in which it
showed a clothing line titled BUFU (By Us, Fuck You), which parodied
the plaintiff’s actual clothing line FUBU (For Us, By Us) designed for
“multicultural youth.” 114 The court analyzed only the parody issue,
stating that parodies are “entitled to full protection under the First
Amendment and pursuant to the substantial body of case law
establishing ‘safe harbors’ for this form of comical expression.” 115 The
court then granted summary judgment “because [the defendant] used
‘BUFU’ as a parody.” 116 The court cited a number of cases to support its
legal holding—including Yankee Publishing Inc. v. News America
Publishing Inc., 117 L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 118 and
Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Nature Labs 119—but never explained
the differences between these cases. 120 The court also claimed to review
the likelihood of confusion factors, but it was clear that the decisive
issue was whether the defendant’s work was a parody. 121
This approach seems deficient because it categorizes parody as
protected without a thorough analysis of what a parody is. It also
neglects to acknowledge or delineate what competing rights and interests
are at stake. Thus, the conclusion is doubly bad. Not because it reached
the wrong result (it did not)—but because it, first, fails to define parody

112. GTFM, LLC v. Universal Studios, Inc., No. 02 CV. 0506(RO), 2006 WL 1377048
(S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2006).
113. Id.
114. Id. at *1.
115. Id. at *2.
116. Id.
117. Id. n.4 (citing Yankee Publ’g Inc. v. News Am. Publ’g Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267, 279
(S.D.N.Y. 1992)).
118. Id. (citing L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1987)).
119. Id. (citing Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Nature Labs, LLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410, 414
(S.D.N.Y. 2002)).
120. Id. at *2.
121. Id. at *3 (“An explicit consideration of each of the eight Polaroid factors tips the scales
entirely in favor of the defendants, and need not be discussed here.” (emphasis in original)).
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in any meaningful way, and, second, inappropriately applies First
Amendment protection to any parody regardless of whether the speech is
commercial or whether confusion exists.
b.

Parodic URLs and Initial Interest Confusion

The last approach, 122 which sometimes involves trademark disputes
over domain names, operates within the doctrine of initial interest
confusion. This doctrine holds actionable confusion that occurs away
from the point of sale—that is, when the consumer initially sees the
product but prior to her buying it. 123 The theory posits that some
consumers’ initial confusion, even if later dispelled, will cause them to
buy the competing product. Why? Out of mere convenience. Notice no
confusion exists at the point of sale; the confusion is actionable because
it eventually could lead to lost sales. At least one court applying this
doctrine in the context of domain names has found liability. On its view,
initial interest confusion is tantamount to diverting future sales.124
Cases in the parody context are no different. The most prominent case
in this area is People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) v.
Doughney. 125 The plaintiff (PETA) was an organization that advocated
122. There is one other approach that appears in trademark disputes involving domain names, but
it was rejected by the court that considered it. The approach was based on the requirement some
courts impose that the defendant’s use of a mark must be “commercial” to infringe. In one case, the
court considered and rejected the argument that parody was a per se exception to the “commercial
use” requirement, holding instead that it merely factored into the confusion test. Utah Lighthouse
Ministry, Inc. v. Discovery Computing, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 2d 889, 897–98 (D. Utah 2007) (stating
that trademark law applies only to the use of a trademark in connection with a commercial
transaction—i.e., a sale of a good or service (citing Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kramer, 403 F.3d 672,
674, 676–77 (9th Cir. 2005))), aff’d, 527 F.3d 1045, 1055, 1058 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that
“[p]arody is another factor to consider in determining the likelihood of confusion, and casts several
of the above-cited six factors in a different light,” agreeing with the district court’s noncommercial
use conclusion in the context of the Anti-Cybersquatting Protection Act’s (ACPA) fair use provision
(citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(IV) (2006))). A similar analysis has been applied to
determining bad faith under the ACPA, where one factor in determining bad faith is whether the
defendant’s use is bona fide noncommercial or fair. See id.
123. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 19, § 23:6.
124. Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1064 (9th Cir. 1999)
(“Suppose West Coast’s competitor (let’s call it ‘Blockbuster’) puts up a billboard on a highway
reading—’West Coast Video: 2 miles ahead at Exit 7’—where West Coast is really located at Exit 8
but Blockbuster is located at Exit 7. Customers looking for West Coast’s store will pull off at Exit 7
and drive around looking for it. Unable to locate West Coast, but seeing the Blockbuster store right
by the highway entrance, they may simply rent there.”).
125. 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit has rejected the PETA court’s approach as
to a finding of commercial use because it would too greatly silence speech. Contra Bosley Med.
Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (“To the extent that the PETA court held
that the Lanham Act’s commercial use requirement is satisfied because the defendant’s use of the
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for animal rights. The defendant had registered the domain name
“peta.org,” which led the Internet surfer to a webpage containing a
disclaimer that it was not the organization PETA, as well as information,
and links to other pages, about eating meat and other carnivorous
activities. 126 The defendant also titled his webpage “People Eating Tasty
Animals,” which contained abundant commentary on eating meat. 127
The defendant claimed his website was a parody and therefore not
infringing under the Lanham Act. The Fourth Circuit disagreed. In
finding infringement, the court relied on the doctrine of initial interest
confusion. The court evaluated the domain name in isolation, focusing
on how it conveyed only the message of affiliation with the plaintiff’s
organization. 128 The court rejected the idea that the content of the
website itself could negate confusion. 129
At first glance, the court’s decision seems understandable. Certain
assumptions inherent in the court’s analysis, though, are not fleshed out.
And those assumptions show the court’s conclusion is erroneous—that it
fell into a variant of the confusion trap. First, the court assumes that the
user is confused when she types in the URL. That could be true in some
abstract sense. If I think that peta.org is the website for PETA, that is
where I think I will be directed. But when I am not directed there—when
I am sent to a parodic website, am I confused? Probably not. (The
stronger argument is that consumers use domain names to verify that

plaintiff’s mark as the domain name may deter customers from reaching the plaintiff’s site itself, we
respectfully disagree with that rationale. While it is true that www.BosleyMedical.com is not
sponsored by Bosley Medical, it is just as true that it is about Bosley Medical. The PETA approach
would place most critical, otherwise protected consumer commentary under the restrictions of the
Lanham Act. Other courts have also rejected this theory as over-expansive.” (emphasis in original)).
126. PETA, 263 F.3d at 363 (“A viewer accessing the website would see the title ‘People Eating
Tasty Animals’ in large, bold type. Under the title, the viewer would see a statement that the
website was a ‘resource for those who enjoy eating meat, wearing fur and leather, hunting, and the
fruits of scientific research.’ The website contained links to various meat, fur, leather, hunting,
animal research, and other organizations, all of which held views generally antithetical to PETA’s
views. Another statement on the website asked the viewer whether he/she was ‘Feeling lost?
Offended? Perhaps you should, like, exit immediately.’ The phrase ‘exit immediately’ contained a
hyperlink to PETA’s official website.” (emphasis in original)).
127. Id. at 362–63.
128. Id. at 366 (“Looking at [the defendant’s] domain name alone, there is no suggestion of a
parody. The domain name peta.org simply copies PETA’s Mark, conveying the message that it is
related to PETA. The domain name does not convey the second, contradictory message needed to
establish a parody—a message that the domain name is not related to PETA, but that it is a parody
of PETA.”).
129. Id. (“[T]his second message [(that the mark is not the original)] is not conveyed
simultaneously with the first message, as required to be considered a parody.” (emphasis in
original)).
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they have reached the appropriate website.) This is important because
the confusion question depends on how the consumer confronts the
mark.
A consumer confronts the mark here in two ways. The first occurs in
isolation as a URL that is typed in. In a basic way, however, the
consumer is not confronting the mark at all here because the mark is not
associated with anything—it is just a word or phrase. So if confusion
occurs at this point, it is not really confusion as to any use of the mark; it
just confusion that is taking place in the mind of the consumer as to
where she might find the website she is looking for.
The actual confrontation, if it exists, takes place once the consumer
gets to the website. It is at this point the prospective consumer wonders,
is this website affiliated with the mark used in the URL? To use a
products analogy: the consumer cannot be confused about the source of
a product until she confronts the product. Just seeing the mark in
isolation does not show confusion, and it is not part of the contextual
confusion analysis. 130
This kind of analysis is not foreign to traditional trademark law
disputes. In Cliffs Notes—the case involving a potentially misleading
cover page—the court noted that consumers do not merely see a product
and make a monolithic decision about its source. As they confront marks
and products, consumers’ expectations shift—what seems like confusion
at first is later dispelled. As to the potentially confusing cover page, the
court noted that consumers would not merely accept ambiguity as the
wrong source: “[E]ven for those few readers who might be slightly
confused by the cover, the most likely reaction would be to open the
book.” 131
There are two other points worth mentioning. First, the court has
assumed that people traditionally get to the websites they desire by
typing in the URL. Many internet surfers, however, use search engines
to search for sites. 132 People search for sites they do know, even those
that they frequently visit. Additionally, many web browsers now save
user history, so past websites visited “pop up” when particular letters are
130. See, e.g., Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Winship Green Nursing Ctr.,
103 F.3d 196, 201 (1st Cir. 1996) (“[B]ecause the listed factors must be evaluated in context, any
meaningful inquiry into the likelihood of confusion necessarily must replicate the circumstances in
which the ordinary consumer actually confronts (or probably will confront) the conflicting mark.”).
131. Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Grp., Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 496 (2d Cir.
1989).
132. What Internet Users Do Online, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT,
http://www.pewinternet.org/Trend-Data-(Adults)/Online-Activites-Total.aspx (last visited Sept. 12,
2011). Perhaps this was not the case when PETA was decided.
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entered into the URL bar by the user. 133 Still other browsers and search
engines use an “autocomplete” feature, which suggests websites the user
may be looking for. 134
Second, if this assumption is true—if users really try to get to
websites (the content of which they know or are likely to know) by
typing in a domain name (that they do not know) containing the
defendant’s mark—then many times there will not be confusion because
the consumers have nothing to be confused about. They know what the
likely content of the website will be, and, when they reach the “wrong”
website, they know that it is not where they wanted to go. When, for
example, I type “www.american.com,” because I do not know the URL
for American Airlines is “www.aa.com,” I am not confused about the
source. I just do not know the correct URL. What I do know is that the
website I want is owned and operated by American Airlines. When I
arrive at the American Enterprise Institute’s online journal, The
American, I am not confused; I know I have typed the wrong URL.
In such a case confusion cannot occur merely when I type in the
URL; it can occur only once I have confronted the website. Websites—
even with domain names—are experiential goods, though they do have
some search good qualities. 135 This leads to the corollary point:
consumers who are looking for an American Airlines website will not be
confused once they get to a website that is not American Airlines,
despite the domain name “www.american.com.”
Thus, the appropriate standard for assessing domain names—and
claims of initial interest confusion—is to confront them as consumers
do: in the context of the webpage to which they are linked. This, of
course, is a statement about how the court should analyze confusion; that
was the issue in the PETA case. But the reasoning applies aptly to any
parody defense.
133. See, e.g., Firefox Features, Browsing Made Easy, Awesome Bar, MOZILLA.COM,
http://www.mozilla.com/en-US/firefox/features/# (last visited July 13, 2011) (explaining how
Awesome Bar allows you to “[g]et to your favorite sites quickly – even if you don’t remember the
URLs,” as “the autocomplete function will include possible matches from your browsing history,
bookmarked sites and open tabs”).
134. Autocomplete, GOOGLE.COM, https://support.google.com/websearch/answer/106230?hl=
en&ref_topic=3081616 (last visited Aug. 11, 2013) (“As you type within the search box on Google,
Autocomplete helps you find information quickly by displaying searches that might be similar to the
one you’re typing. For example, as you start to type [ new york ], you may be able to pick searches
for other New York-related search queries.”).
135. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 117 n.51 (2003) (defining “experience goods” as those that have
features difficult to obtain in advance and must be experienced to be consumed, and “search goods”
as products with features that can be evaluated easily before purchase).
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Users confront parodic websites, not when they type in the URL, but
rather when they visit the webpage displayed at a particular URL. Thus,
initial interest confusion is a doctrine especially unsuited for parodies
online. To resolve this problem, courts should evaluate initial parody
claims over domain names by looking to the content of the website in
conjunction with the URL. At least one older case has taken such an
approach in a non-internet setting. 136 Likewise, other parody claims of
initial interest confusion must be particularly attuned to the way in
which the consumer confronts the mark, not merely how the mark
appears in isolation.
B.

Approaches to Trademark Dilution Actions Involving Parody

Just as courts deciding infringement claims involving parody use a
variety of approaches to resolve the claims, courts confronting dilution
claims have their own methods for analyzing claims involving parody.
The dilution cases citing Campbell 137 use six approaches to analyzing
parody in dilution. 138 Because dilution can involve either actions for
blurring (diminishing the distinctiveness of the mark) or tarnishment
(causing associations to unsavory or inferior products or images), the
approaches can vary by action. The most current dilution statute, 139 for
example, provides courts with six factors to analyze a dilution claim; 140
136. Cf. Cliff’s Notes, 886 F.2d at 496 (“Moreover, even for those few readers who might be
slightly confused by the cover, the most likely reaction would be to open the book.”).
137. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC (Louis Vuitton II), 507 F.3d 252
(4th Cir. 2007); Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc. (Mattel III), 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002);
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994); Burnett v. Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp., 491 F. Supp. 2d 962 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v.
Haute Diggity Dog, LLC (Louis Vuitton I), 464 F. Supp. 2d 495 (E.D. Va. 2006); Mastercard Int’l
Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm. Inc., No. 00 Civ.6068(GBD), 2004 WL 434404 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
8, 2004); World Wrestling Fed’n Entm’t, Inc. (WWE) v. Big Dog Holdings, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d
413 (W.D. Pa. 2003); Kane v. Comedy Partners, No. 00 Civ. 158(GBD), 2003 WL 22383387
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2003); Charles Atlas, Ltd. v. DC Comics, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y.
2000); Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc. (Mattel II), 28 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (C.D. Cal. 1998); Mattel,
Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc. (Mattel I), No. CV 97-6791 WMB, 1998 WL 422641 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 18,
1998); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc. (Dr. Seuss I), 924 F. Supp. 1559 (S.D.
Cal. 1996); Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece (Elvis Presley I), 950 F. Supp. 783 (S.D. Tex.
1996); Schieffelin & Co. v. Jack Co. of Boca, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
138. Within my calculations I include all dilution claims, including state law claims and claims
under the prior federal dilution law (the Federal Trademark Dilution Act).
139. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006).
140. Id. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(i)–(vi) (listing the six factors as the degree of similarity between the
marks, how distinctive the famous mark is, how much the famous mark is used exclusively by the
mark owner, how recognized the famous mark is, the intent of the user, and any actual association
between the marks).
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but no such factors exist to analyze a tarnishment claim. 141 For this
reason, courts have used in blurring but not tarnishment cases the same
kind of Infusion Approach they sometimes employ in the infringementparody context. Other times, however, courts use identical analyses for
both blurring and tarnishment claims. The current law governing
dilution—the Trademark Dilution Revision Act (TDRA) 142—for
example, exempts from liability uses of marks in a “noncommercial”
manner. 143 Because this defense applies to dilution generally, courts
have applied it to both blurring and tarnishment claims.
Table 2 shows how courts citing Campbell analyze dilution claims in
parody cases. The most popular defense has been to rely on the TDRA
defense of noncommercial use. Indeed, courts analyze 54% of all
dilution claims using this method. The approaches with the next highest
usage rates are No Harm (15%) (for tarnishment only) and Per Se NonDiluting findings (15%). The former occurs where the plaintiff fails to
provide actual evidence that the defendant’s use tarnished its mark. The
latter occurs where the court simply finds that parodies, in and of
themselves, are not capable of dilution. The other approaches—Infusion,
No Confusion, and Standard Dilution—are used rather minimally. In
what follows, I explain in more detail each of these approaches, as well
as their desirability.

141. Id. § 1125(c)(2)(C) (defining “‘dilution by tarnishment’ [as] association arising from the
similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the reputation of the famous
mark”).
142. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 1125(c)).
143. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(C).
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TABLE 2. APPROACHES TO TRADEMARK PARODY IN
DILUTION CASES CITING CAMPBELL V. ACUFF-ROSE
Parody Approach
Noncommercial
No Harm
Per Se Non-Diluting
Infusion
No Confusion
Standard Dilution

Blurring
7*
0
3
1
1
0

Tarnishment
7
4
1
0
1
1

Times Used
14
4
4
1
2
1

12

14

26

Total

%
54%
15%
15%
4%
8%
4%
100%

*One case, Mattel v. Walking Mountain Productions, used the Noncommercial Approach for both
the blurring and tarnishment claims. It is double counted, which explains the total of 26 total uses.

1.

Noncommercial Use

As mentioned above, the Lanham Act provides three defenses to
dilution—one of which is “noncommercial use of a mark.” 144 But just
what constitutes a “noncommercial use”? Some courts have held that
parody just is per se noncommercial use. 145 Others have been more
thorough in their explanation. The most complete explanation of why a
parodic use is a noncommercial use comes from a trio of courts deciding
the same case, which involved the use of the Barbie trademark in a
song. 146
To interpret the term “noncommercial use,” these courts used the
legislative history of the TDRA. In their view, the legislative history
showed that the TDRA was not meant to “prohibit or threaten
noncommercial expression, such as parody, satire, editorial and other
forms of expression that are not a part of a commercial transaction.” 147
Taking cues from the committee reports, the cases found First
Amendment jurisprudence—which defined “commercial speech” as
144. Id.
145. See Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003); Mattel, Inc. v.
MCA Records, Inc. (Mattel III), 296 F.3d 894, 905 (9th Cir. 2002); Burnett v. Twentieth Century
Fox Film Corp., 491 F. Supp. 2d 962 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Mastercard Int’l Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary
Comm. Inc., No. 00 Civ.6068(GBD), 2004 WL 434404 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2004); Mattel, Inc. v.
MCA Records, Inc. (Mattel II), 28 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (C.D. Cal. 1998); Mattel, Inc. v. MCA
Records, Inc. (Mattel I), No. CV 97-6791 WMB, 1998 WL 422641 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 1998); Dr.
Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc. (Dr. Seuss I), 924 F. Supp. 1559 (S.D. Cal. 1996).
146. Mattel III, 296 F.3d at 905; Mattel II, 28 F. Supp. 2d 1120; Mattel I, 1998 WL 422641.
147. Mattel III, 296 F.3d at 905 (quoting 141 CONG. REC. 38,559 (1995) (statement of Sen.
Hatch)); Mattel II, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1155 n.55 (quoting same).
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speech that “does no more than propose a commercial transaction” 148—
to be the relevant interpretive tool. 149 A parody, then, is usually
expressive speech that is not encompassed within this definition. Even if
a parody had a commercial purpose, that alone is not enough to make the
use “commercial” where the commercial purpose is “inextricably
entwined with . . . expressive elements.” 150 In such a case, the speech “is
not purely commercial.” 151
These courts applied the noncommercial use exception to carry out
Congress’ intent in drafting the bill. The question is whether parody fits
within the noncommercial exception. After all, there are other possible
candidate defenses: the TDRA explicitly mentions parody as a defense
to dilution (when the use is fair and is “other than as a designation of
source”). 152 To that end, some have argued that assessing parody under
the noncommercial exemption would render the fair use provision
superfluous because it expressly exempts parody. 153 That is an overly
narrow reading of the statute. The fair use provision merely mentions
parody as a type of fair use of a mark “other than as a designation of
source.” 154 In other words, it exempts parody (and criticism and
commentary) as fair use when the parodic use is not done as a mark; it
says nothing about parodic uses that are source identifying. Parodies that
act as source identifiers also have expressive value, as the committee
report indicates. 155
148. Mattel III, 296 F.3d at 906 (quoting Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180,
1184 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod’s Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983)).
149. Id. (“To determine whether Barbie Girl falls within this exemption, we look to our definition
of commercial speech under our First Amendment caselaw.” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at
8, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1035 (“[T]he exemption ‘expressly incorporates the
concept of “commercial” speech from the “commercial speech” doctrine’”); 141 CONG. REC.
38,560 (1995) (“[T]he exemption ‘is consistent with existing [First Amendment] case law’”
(alteration in original))); Mattel II, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1155.
150. Mattel III, 296 F.3d at 906 (quoting Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1185).
151. Id.
152. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A) (2006) (“Any fair use, including a nominative or descriptive fair
use, or facilitation of such fair use, of a famous mark by another person other than as a designation
of source for the person’s own goods or services, including use in connection
with . . . (ii) . . . parodying . . . the famous mark owner or the goods or services of the famous mark
owner.”); 152 CONG. REC. 19,238 (2006) (statement of Rep. Smith) (“Finally, amendments
developed by the subcommittee and the other body will more clearly protect traditional first
amendment [sic] uses, such as parody and criticism. These amendments provide balance to the law
by strengthening traditional fair-use defenses.”).
153. Duncan, supra note 90, at 240–41.
154. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A).
155. Simply because a use of a mark as a source identifier is “in commerce” does not mean that
the use is “commercial.” See H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 8 (1995).
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The noncommercial use defense seems like a reasonably good place
to situate parody for a few reasons. First, it is true to the legislative
history of the TDRA. Second, rather than having to start from scratch,
the noncommercial use exception capitalizes on existing First
Amendment jurisprudence. Of course, there are still issues about what
counts as “noncommercial,” and how wide or narrow that definition is.
Under the Ninth Circuit’s approach, for example, expressive elements
render commercial purpose effete. Other courts, as one commentator has
noted, do the opposite, finding that any commercial purpose, despite its
expressive elements, will render a use “commercial” for the purpose of
dilution. 156 Still, compared to the other analytical methods courts use,
the noncommercial use exception is a suitable starting place for a parody
analysis in the dilution context. The definition of “noncommercial” is
something I take up in my proposal for a parody defense.
2.

No Harm (Tarnishment Only)

Tarnishment claims are premised on two ideas. First, the owner of a
famous mark has the right to decide what images, feelings, and notions
people associate with it. Second, that right is violated by a use that
creates an association with an inferior or unwholesome product or
image. Even so, courts sometimes find under the No Harm Approach
that no tarnishment occurs because the plaintiff has failed to produce
evidence that the defendant’s use caused harm. That is, the plaintiff
usually fails to show that the defendant’s use caused an association with
an inferior or unsavory product.
In Louis Vuitton II, for example, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s
argument that the defendant’s dog toys were potentially unsafe because
“[t]here [was] no record support . . . that any dog has choked on a pet
chew toy, such as a ‘Chewy Vuiton’ toy, or that there is any basis from
which to conclude that a dog would likely choke on such a toy.” 157
Likewise, in Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. Capece (Elvis Presley
I), 158 “[t]he [c]ourt [found] [that] . . . , without any evidence to the
contrary, . . . nude portraits hung in a bar for the purpose of mocking the
tasteless decor of the sixties does not inspire negative or unsavory
images of Elvis or Elvis related products or services in the minds of EPE

156. Patrick D. Curran, Diluting the Commercial Speech Doctrine: “Noncommercial Use” and
the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1077, 1082–87 (2004).
157. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC (Louis Vuitton II), 507 F.3d 252,
269 (4th Cir. 2007).
158. 950 F. Supp. 783 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
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customers.” 159 Thus, dilution was not actionable in either case.
Although the No Harm Approach has worked in some cases, it lacks
real speech protections. Proving harm is an element of a dilution claim,
rather than a defense to one. Thus, requiring evidence of harm is an
appropriate element of a dilution claim. But, by itself, the harm
requirement does not protect parodies precisely because we expect (and
at least one court found that) a parodic use to cause some kind of harm
(tarnishment). 160 If this is true, proving harm will be easy in many cases
where the defendant uses the mark in a parodic fashion. So simply
requiring a plaintiff to prove harm will provide no protection for parodic
uses. For these reasons, the No Harm Approach is not suited to provide
protective cover for parody.
3.

Per Se Non-Diluting

In some cases, courts will find that a parodic use simply does not
dilute a famous mark. In World Wrestling Federation Entertainment,
Inc. (WWE) v. Big Dog Holdings, Inc., 161 for example, the court was
confronted with T-shirts that displayed caricatures (such as “Bone Cold
Steve Pawstin”) of World Wrestling Federation characters (such as
Stone Cold Steve Austin). 162 Looking to other similar cases for guidance
on the dilution claim, the court found that a parodic use was unlikely to
erode the public’s identification with the parodied (that is, the original)
mark. 163 To the contrary, the parodic use would likely increase such
identification by reaffirming the original meaning to make a parody. 164
This approach is similar to what I argued for in my previous article on
parody in copyright: parody should be considered per se fair use. The
Per Se Non-Diluting Approach proposes essentially the same thing: if
the use is a parody, it does not dilute the original. That is fine, as far as it
goes. But a rigid parody defense might also have negative consequences.
Because parody is often contrasted to satire (which is usually not
protected), the defense may encourage courts to adopt a narrow
definition of parody (as opposed to satire) to avoid the risk of allowing

159. Id. at 799.
160. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 777 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting that
survey results showed people thought negatively of the plaintiff’s mark as a result of the defendant’s
parodic use).
161. 280 F. Supp. 2d 413 (W.D. Pa. 2003).
162. Id. at 420.
163. Id. at 441 (citing Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1987)).
164. Id.
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or appearing to allow expansive uses of trademarks without the owner’s
permission. If that occurs, the defense could actually harm parodists,
whose rights could decrease if the definition is cabined too much. (This
scenario differs from copyright where a fair use defense is available
even if the court finds the work is not a parody.)
Perhaps the biggest shortcoming of the per se defense, though, is also
its strength: it immunizes all parodic uses from liability. Because the
degree to which parody is immunized depends upon the term’s
definition, any balancing of interests occurs ex ante; that is, once we
settle upon a definition, we cannot later reweigh the interests. That said,
the per se defense has merit in recognizing a particular form of
expressive speech that deserves protection from overzealous trademark
owners. Below, I attempt to massage this virtue into a scheme that uses a
presumption of fairness for parodies. To reduce the risk of speech
suppression, I suggest we define parody in trademark more broadly than
in copyright.
4.

No Confusion

Other courts have decided that parody determinations should be the
same for infringement and dilution. That was what the court did in Kane
v. Comedy Partners, 165 holding that the defendant’s parodic use
eliminated any potential confusion. 166 After making that finding, the
court held that no dilution existed (under state law) “[f]or the same
reasons identified in the discussion of plaintiff’s federal trademark
claim.” 167
This standard need not detour us long. Confusion is not an element of
dilution under federal law (or state law). For this reason alone, we can
discard the No Confusion Approach. Still, it is worth noting that the
court was applying the same standard—whatever it was—to confusion
and dilution parody defenses. Whether that is a good idea is an important
question. Some have argued for identical standards. 168 But like the
differences between copyright law and trademark law, the differences
between dilution and infringement are important.
Even a little digging shows that the two require different defenses,
even if they define parody identically. In Part III.A, for example, I
propose a parody presumption for the confusion analysis. The plaintiff
165.
166.
167.
168.

No. 00 Civ. 158(GBD), 2003 WL 22383387 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2003).
Id. at *8.
Id.
Duncan, supra note 90, at 243.
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can rebut this presumption by showing that the defendant used the mark
on closely related products sold by a direct competitor. That standard
makes sense in the infringement context, where trademark law is
worried about consumer confusion. But in the dilution context,
trademark law is worried about the trademark’s “image”—its
distinctiveness—not confusion. Thus, the same kind of parody
presumption makes little sense in dilution because dilution claims should
not include parodic uses of marks on competing products. They will
instead include claims where no consumer would be confused about who
made the products or services on which the parodic mark appears. Thus,
a new dilution test for parody should differ from the test used in the
infringement analysis.
5.

Infusion (Blurring Only)

The previous Part demonstrated that courts analyzing traditional
infringement actions let parody color the likelihood of confusion factors.
At least one court also has analyzed dilution by blurring in the same
manner. In Louis Vuitton II, the court noted that “the fact that the
defendant uses its marks as a parody is specifically relevant to several of
the listed factors”:
[F]actor (v) (whether the defendant intended to create an
association with the famous mark) and factor (vi) (whether there
exists an actual association between the defendant’s mark and
the famous mark) directly invite inquiries into the defendant’s
intent in using the parody, the defendant’s actual use of the
parody, and the effect that its use has on the famous mark. While
a parody intentionally creates an association with the famous
mark in order to be a parody, it also intentionally communicates,
if it is successful, that it is not the famous mark, but rather a
satire of the famous mark. 169
Parody similarly influenced the application of other factors, such as
the similarity between the marks, the distinctiveness of the famous mark,
and its famousness. 170 “Indeed, by making the famous mark an object of
the parody,” the court reasoned, “a successful parody might actually
enhance the famous mark’s distinctiveness by making it an icon.” 171
The Infusion Approach has some benefits as well as drawbacks. It
169. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC (Louis Vuitton II), 507 F.3d 252,
267 (4th Cir. 2007) (emphasis in original).
170. Id.
171. Id.
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changes the dilution analysis to favor speech interests, just as the
Infusion Approach does in the infringement analysis. The similarity of
the two tests also means they share the same weakness: altering the
factors is not a defense to dilution. Instead, it is a reframing of the
dilution inquiry. For that reason, the test by itself is insufficient to
protect speech interests.
6.

Standard Dilution

Courts unconvinced by the merit of special treatment for parody will
apply a standard dilution analysis. In other words, they will assess the
dilution claim in parody cases as they would in any other case. The court
in Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications 172 used this approach
when deciding whether tarnishment existed from an ad depicting
Michelob beer as containing oil, which appeared in a “humor magazine”
called Snicker. 173 The ad related to an oil spill affecting the water source
that Anheuser-Busch used for its beer. 174 Under Missouri state law
dilution, the court held (based on “the majority of those surveyed”) that
the parodic advertisement “suggest[ed] that Michelob beer contains oil,
[which] . . . obviously tarnishes the marks’ carefully-developed
images.” 175
What is strange about this analysis is not that the court found
tarnishment, but that it did so based expressly on the parodic nature of
the use. That gets it wrong. One purpose of the First Amendment is to
prevent others—in this case, trademark owners—from silencing speech
that they do not like. 176 Why that statement should be less true in a
commercial setting, particularly when the use is “truthful” or nonmisleading, is not clear. The fact that the ad was a parody and casted
Michelob in a negative light is just the point. But the Balducci court did
not assess the First Amendment interests at stake. In this way, it made a
crucial analytical mistake.

172. 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994).
173. Id. at 772.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 777.
176. See, e.g., L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1987) (“If the
anti-dilution statute were construed as permitting a trademark owner to enjoin the use of his mark in
a noncommercial context found to be negative or offensive, then a corporation could shield itself
from criticism by forbidding the use of its name in commentaries critical of its conduct.”); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25(2) cmt. i (1995) (explaining that expanding
nontrademark dilution to cover nontrademark uses implicates free speech concerns and is better
addressed by other causes of action).
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That mistake seems obvious when comparing other parody dilution
cases. As Table 3 shows, no matter what method courts used, all of them
found no dilution existed—all, that is, except the Balducci court.
TABLE 3. PARODY CASES CITING CAMPBELL &
FINDING TRADEMARK AND/OR TRADEMARK DILUTION
Trademark
Infringement (%)*
0 (0)

No Trademark
Infringement (%)
1 (7)

Total (%)

No Trademark
Dilution

2 (100)

12 (93)

14 (93)

Total

2 (100)

13 (100)

15 (100)

Trademark
Dilution

1 (7)

177

*I excluded from this table one case
that found no trademark dilution, and then found both no
trademark infringement and trademark infringement as to two separate marks.

II.

CAMPBELL AS A LENS: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
PARODY CLAIMS IN COPYRIGHT AND TRADEMARK LAW

A.

Parody Cases Citing Campbell: Trademark Infringement and
Dilution Cases

Part I examined a variety of approaches courts use to evaluate parody
claims in trademark law. This Part examines how courts treat parody
claims in trademark relative to parody claims in copyright. It does this
first with a description of whether copyright and trademark parody
claims relate to each other. Once that description is adumbrated, we can
begin to examine how and why a relationship (if any) exists. To narrow
our focus, we will again focus on cases citing Campbell.
Courts that cite or discuss Campbell’s statements about parody use
Campbell’s pronouncements on parody differently. Of the twenty-five
trademark cases that cite or discuss Campbell’s statements about
parody, 178 only thirteen specifically cite Campbell in the trademark (or
177. Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece (Elvis Presley I), 950 F. Supp. 783 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
178. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC (Louis Vuitton II), 507 F.3d 252
(4th Cir. 2007); Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003); Mattel, Inc.
v. MCA Records, Inc. (Mattel III), 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002); Harley-Davidson, Inc. v.
Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806 (2d Cir. 1999); Lyons P’ship v. Giannoulas (Giannoulas II), 179 F.3d 384
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First Amendment) analysis of parody. 179 Some courts assert that
Campbell is relevant to the parody determination in trademark. 180 One
court that mentioned Campbell expressly disclaimed reliance on it for
trademark parody analysis, 181 another court distinguished Campbell in

(5th Cir. 1999); Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece (Elvis Presley II), 141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir.
1998); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc. (Dr. Seuss II), 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir.
1997); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996);
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 28 F.3d 769; CCA & B, LLC v. F + W Media Inc., 819 F. Supp. 2d 1310
(N.D. Ga. 2011); Protectmarriage.com v. Courage Campaign, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1225 (E.D. Cal.
2010); Burck v. Mars, Inc., 571 F. Supp. 2d 446 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Burnett v. Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corp., 491 F. Supp. 2d 962, 967–69 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (finding the work could be reasonably
perceived as a parody and then holding use was fair); Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity
Dog, LLC (Louis Vuitton I), 464 F. Supp. 2d 495 (E.D. Va. 2006); Mastercard Int’l Inc. v. Nader
2000 Primary Comm., Inc., No. 00 Civ.6068(GBD), 2004 WL 434404 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2004);
World Wrestling Fed’n Entm’t, Inc. (WWE) v. Big Dog Holdings, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d 413 (W.D.
Pa. 2003); Kane v. Comedy Partners, No. 00 Civ. 158(GBD), 2003 WL 22383387 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
16, 2003); N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc. v. Gahary, 196 F. Supp. 2d 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Charles Atlas,
Ltd. v. DC Comics, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Lyons P’ship v. Giannoulas
(Giannoulas I), 14 F. Supp. 2d 947 (N.D. Tex. 1998); Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc. (Mattel II),
28 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (C.D. Cal. 1998); Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc. (Mattel I), No. CV 976791 WMB, 1998 WL 422641 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 1998); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books
USA, Inc. (Dr. Seuss I), 924 F. Supp. 1559 (S.D. Cal. 1996); Elvis Presley I, 950 F. Supp. 783;
Schieffelin & Co. v. Jack Co. of Boca, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
179. Mattel III, 296 F.3d at 901–02 (discussing parody and citing Campbell in its First
Amendment analysis under the Rogers test, and not engaging in the confusion analysis); Grottanelli,
164 F.3d at 813; Giannoulas II, 179 F.3d at 388 (citing Campbell to define parody); Elvis Presley II,
141 F.3d at 199 (noting Campbell as relevant to the parody question in trademark law and using it to
define parody); Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d at 776 (citing Campbell in discussion of First
Amendment principles explaining why it did not negate confusion); Protectmarriage.com, 680 F.
Supp. 2d at 1228 n.3; Burck, 571 F. Supp. 2d at 455 (quoting Campbell for propositions that
defendant’s use must comment on the plaintiff’s mark, and that a parody can shed new light on the
original); N.Y. Stock Exch., 196 F. Supp. 2d at 411–12 (citing “reasonable perception” language and
quoting Campbell for propositions as to First Amendment interests, and finding that a parody
finding informs the trademark analysis); Charles Atlas, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 337–41 (defining parody
using Campbell under the First Amendment analysis and having that inform its trademark analysis);
Giannoulas I, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 953 (citing Campbell in good-faith intent portion of analysis);
Mattel II, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1134, 1142 (citing Campbell using “see also” signal for proposition that
parody must focus on original, and also citing it in its discussion about how a parody can comment
on associations people have with marks); Mattel I, 1998 WL 422641, at *12 (discussing Campbell
and the definition of parody when analyzing the similarity of the marks in the confusion analysis);
Elvis Presley I, 950 F. Supp. at 792 (quoting Campbell when defining parody when analyzing the
strength of the mark).
180. Elvis Presley II, 141 F.3d at 199 (noting that Campbell “is relevant to the treatment of
parody in the trademark context”); Grottanelli, 164 F.3d at 813 (“[T]rademark parody must be
informed by the Supreme Court’s recent elucidation in the copyright context of parodies allegedly
protected by the defense of fair use.”).
181. Schieffelin, 850 F. Supp. at 249 n.9 (“The Acuff–Rose decision does not impact the court’s
decision here, inasmuch as the interests protected under the Lanham Act are not identical to those of
the copyright holder.”).
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passing, 182 and yet another implied that it was not relevant to trademark
parody claims. 183 No court cited Campbell in its dilution analysis.
Exactly how these courts analyze parody within each method is
different. Some courts, for example, incorporate copyright case law by
analyzing trademark parodies using Campbell. 184 Other courts simply
apply trademark case law to the parody question, ignoring Campbell
altogether. 185
More importantly, in cases with copyright and trademark
infringement claims, some courts tend to decide the parody question (is
the defendant’s work a parody?) in the copyright context, and then apply
that finding summarily to the remaining trademark-parody question (is
the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s mark confusing?). 186 In these cases,
courts will make a finding as to copyright parody, relying on Campbell,
and then analyze the trademark parody claim as if the copyright analysis
of whether a parody existed applied equally to the trademark parody
claim, engaging in little or no analysis of the latter issue. Thus, the
copyright parody question sometimes is determinative of the trademark
parody question.

182. Protectmarriage.com, 680 F. Supp. 2d at 1228 n.3 (“In this regard, the Lanham Act is unlike
the Copyright Act. The Copyright Act includes a specific statutory provision defining “fair use” as
non-infringing, 17 U.S.C. § 107, and this statutory provision protects parody.” (citing Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994))).
183. Louis Vuitton II, 507 F.3d at 269 (“Finally, LVM argues that the district court erred in
finding that Haute Diggity Dog’s use of the ‘CV’ and the background design was a fair use of
LVM’s copyrighted Multicolor design. Because LVM attempts to use a copyright claim to pursue
what is at its core a trademark and trade dress infringement claim, application of the fair-use factors
under the Copyright Act to these facts is awkward.” (citing 17 U.S.C. § 107; Campbell, 510 U.S. at
577)).
184. See, e.g., Elvis Presley II, 141 F.3d at 199; see also supra Tables 1 & 2 (including cases that
cite Campbell but do not involve a copyright claim).
185. E.g., Schieffelin, 850 F. Supp. at 249 n.9 (disclaiming reliance on Campbell).
186. World Wrestling Fed’n Entm’t, Inc. (WWE) v. Big Dog Holdings, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d
413, 430 (W.D. Pa. 2003); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc. (Dr. Seuss II), 109
F.3d 1394, 1400–01, 1405 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding a parody did not exist in the copyright realm, not
examining parody in depth in the trademark analysis, and concluding the defendant infringed the
plaintiff’s mark); Kane v. Comedy Partners, No. 00 Civ. 158(GBD), 2003 WL 22383387, at *3–8
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2003); Lyons P’ship v. Giannoulas (Giannoulas I), 14 F. Supp. 2d 947, 952,
954–55 (N.D. Tex. 1998), aff’d, 179 F.3d 384, 388 (5th Cir. 1999). In Kane, the court spent a
considerable amount of time analyzing whether the copyrighted work at issue parodied the
underlying work—a clip from the plaintiff’s show where she is dancing and singing the song, “I
Love Dick.” 2003 WL 22383387, at *2. Then, in its assessment of the Lanham Act claim for the
mark “The Sandy Kane Comedy T.V. Show,” which was displayed on the video, the court
determined “clear[ly] that someone else’s work is being displayed and ridiculed.” Id. at *8. At least
one other court has analyzed parody using what it saw as different standards in copyright and
trademark. CCA & B, LLC v. F + W Media Inc., 819 F. Supp. 2d 1310 (N.D. Ga. 2011).
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Take, for example, the district court’s decision in Dr. Seuss I 187 There
the defendant had written a book about O.J. Simpson’s trial and had used
Dr. Seuss’ style and trademarks—and similar images—to describe the
story, which the defendant titled, A Cat NOT in the Hat. 188 The plaintiff
sued for copyright and trademark infringement.
Before reaching the trademark question, the court analyzed the parody
issue in the copyright context. It found that one of the defendant’s works
was not a parody and two were. 189 When analyzing the (various)
trademarks at issue, the court seemed to assume that the defendant used
the marks (but not the trade dress) in a parodic fashion, apparently
letting the copyright finding flow into the trademark analysis. As a
result, the copyright parody finding altered the trademark likelihood
confusion factors—the strength of the marks, 190 the marks’ similarity, 191
and the defendant’s intent 192—in the defendant’s favor. Of course, that
did not save the defendant, 193 as the district court granted a preliminary
injunction, which the appeals court affirmed. 194
Viewing all these approaches together, it becomes apparent that
courts have developed three methods of parody analysis. Where the
plaintiff alleges copyright and/or trademark infringement claims and the
defendant asserts its work or mark is a parody, the courts:
(1) determine parody in its copyright analysis using Campbell
and summarily applies that finding to its trademark (or First
Amendment) analysis;
(2) determine parody in its trademark analysis, drawing on
Campbell to define or articulate reasoning or conclusion; or
(3) determine parody using only trademark case law.
The question then becomes whether any of these approaches is more
appropriate than the others. Answering that question requires us to
determine to what extent copyright and trademark claims are linked.
The data show different relationships between copyright infringement
187. 924 F. Supp. 1559 (S.D. Cal. 1996), aff’d, 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
188. Id. at 1561.
189. Id. at 1570.
190. Id. (“The fact of copying, admitted in any parody case, is itself evidence of the strength of
the marks.”).
191. Id. at 1570–71 (noting that the defendant’s book had a subtitle of “A Parody” and the
author’s name as “Dr. Juice”).
192. Id. at 1571 (noting intent to parody does not weigh against the defendant and that “[t]he
prominent labeling of the work as ‘A Parody,’ and the disclaimer sticker on the back indicate that
this factor should weigh in favor of Penguin”).
193. Id. at 1562.
194. F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
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and trademark infringement and dilution. Table 4 shows the relationship
between copyright and dilution infringement findings. There is only one
case in which a court found dilution, and it occurred in a case where no
copyright claim existed. In the seven cases where courts found copyright
infringement, no court found dilution. Thus, it does not appear there is a
relationship between dilution and copyright parody findings. It follows,
then, that the data do not reveal a relationship between Campbell and
dilution claims.
TABLE 4. PARODY CASES CITING CAMPBELL &
FINDING COPYRIGHT OR TRADEMARK DILUTION
Copyright
Infringement (%)

No Copyright
Infringement (%)

No Copyright
Claim (%)

Total
(%)

0 (0)

0 (0)

1 (12)

1 (6)

No Trademark
Dilution

7 (100)

2 (100)

7 (88)

16 (94)

Total

7 (100)

2 (100)

8 (100)

17 (100)

Trademark
Dilution

195

*One case
that found trademark infringement and no trademark infringement as to two separate
marks. This decision was excluded from calculations

The story is different, however, for trademark infringement claims.
As Table 5 shows, in every case where a plaintiff alleged both copyright
and trademark infringement, courts made corresponding infringement
findings: if a court found that no copyright infringement existed, it also
found no trademark infringement—and vice versa.

195. Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece (Elvis Presley II), 950 F. Supp. 783 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
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TABLE 5. PARODY CASES CITING CAMPBELL FINDING
COPYRIGHT OR TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT
Copyright
Infringement (%)

No Copyright
Infringement (%)

No Copyright
Claim (%)*

Total
(%)

Trademark
Infringement

2 (100)

0 (0)

3 (25)

5 (22)

No Trademark
Infringement

0 (0)

9 (100)

9 (75)

18 (78)

Total

2 (100)

9 (100)

12 (100)

23 (100)

196

*I excluded from this table one case
that found no copyright infringement then found both no
trademark infringement and trademark infringement as to two separate marks.

More specifically, there were eight cases where courts found no
copyright infringement. In all of these cases the courts also found no
trademark infringement. By contrast, in the two cases where courts
found copyright infringement, the courts also found trademark
infringement. At least in trademark parody cases citing Campbell, some
relationship exists between infringement findings in copyright and
trademark—and between the use of Campbell and the parody doctrine in
each.
What is occurring in the remaining twelve cases (citing Campbell)
where only a trademark parody was at issue is less clear. Focusing on the
three cases in which the defendant’s parody defense failed might help
clarify things. 197 If these cases share similarities, they might tell us
something about why, methodologically, the courts find parodies
infringing. These cases also might give use clues as to how the
incorporation or exclusion of Campbell influences courts’ decisions.
These three cases teach two basic lessons. First, the outcomes in each
case are a function of how extensively the court incorporates the parody
into the likelihood of confusion analysis. Second, these courts have
either expressly applied Campbell to trademark law, or disclaimed it.
Just why they have done so raises important issues, as we will see in a
moment.
196. Id.
197. Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 812–13 (2d Cir. 1999); Elvis Presley II,
141 F.3d 188; Schieffelin & Co. v. Jack Co. of Boca, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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Let us start with Schieffelin & Co. v. Jack Co. of Boca, Inc. 198 The
product at issue was a Dom Popingnon label, which the defendant had
affixed to a plastic champagne bottle filled with popcorn seeds. 199 When
the owners of the Dom Pérignon mark (used on Champagne) sued, the
defendant claimed the use of the mark was to parody Dom Pérignon. 200
The court held the Dom Popingnon mark infringed. 201 The question is,
why?
The answer lies in the two lessons I mentioned above. First, the court
minimally incorporated speech concerns. Although the court purported
to use an “infusion” approach—weaving First Amendment/parody
considerations into the likelihood of confusion analysis—it did so only
with two of the eight Polaroid factors.202 As to the “good faith” Polaroid
factor, the court analyzed it in light of the parody. 203 It found the
defendant had an intent to parody, which meant that the factor did “not
weigh against defendants.” 204 As to the similarity of the marks, the court
recognized that the defendant selected a well-known mark because “one
would hardly make a spoof of an obscure or unknown product[.]” 205
Yet, in analyzing the other confusion factors, the court paid little
attention to First Amendment (or parodic) considerations. So, for
example, it did not apply any parody considerations to its analysis of the
strength of the plaintiff’s mark 206—something other courts finding
parody, such as Louis Vuitton II 207 (discussed in Part I)—have done. 208
The court also failed to discuss the issue of parody in its analysis of the
similarity of the products, 209 the likelihood of bridging the gap, 210 the

198. 850 F. Supp. 232.
199. Id. at 235.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 253.
202. See Polaroid Corp. v. Polaroid Elects. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 820 (1961) (listing eight factors to help assess the likelihood of confusion).
203. Schieffelin, 850 F. Supp. at 247–48 (“Although resolution of the issue of parody implicates
other factors in the Polaroid test, most particularly the similarity of the marks and the existence of
actual confusion, the court will address those issues here.”).
204. Id. at 248.
205. Id.
206. See id. at 243–44.
207. 507 F.3d 252, 261 (4th Cir. 2007) (“While it is true that finding a mark to be strong and
famous usually favors the plaintiff in a trademark infringement case, the opposite may be true when
a legitimate claim of parody is involved.”).
208. Schieffelin, 850 F. Supp. at 242–44.
209. Id. at 244–45.
210. Id. at 245.
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quality of the defendant’s products, 211 or the sophistication of the
purchasers. 212
Second, the Schieffelin court explicitly held that Campbell did not
apply to trademark law. “The [Campbell v.] Acuff-Rose decision,” the
court wrote, “does not impact the court’s decision here . . . .” 213 Why?
Because “the interests protected under the Lanham Act are not identical
to those of the copyright holder.” 214 But the court never went on to say
how the interests of trademark users are different from copyright users.
Nor, for that matter, did the court even mention the fact that the rights of
a trademark owner may be different from the rights of a copyright
owner. Finally, it didn’t mention other possible interests, or how these
rights and interests may interact or differ from those in copyright.
The two lessons from Schieffelin also can be seen in Elvis Presley II
and Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli. 215 Elvis Presley II involved
defendants who owned a 1960s-themed nightclub called “The Velvet
Elvis,” which served food, beer, and liquor, and which also featured live
music. 216 In Grottanelli, the defendant owned a motorcycle repair shop
that used a bar-and-shield logo similar to Harley-Davidson’s on his
trademark/logo, which was used in advertisements. 217
Recall the first lesson from Schieffelin was that the court tightly
constrained the parody analysis to more easily find confusion. Likewise,
in both Elvis Presley II and Grottanelli, we see similar kinds of
analytical “constraining.” In Elvis Presley II, for instance, the court—
rather than focus on how the parody informed the confusion analysis
(and restrict it tightly)—applied “parody” as “one . . . other relevant
factor that a court may consider in a likelihood-of-confusion
analysis.” 218 This analytical maneuver allowed it to reverse both the
lower court’s finding of noninfringement and its “infusion” analysis. 219
211. Id. at 250. The court found this factor “neutral” because popcorn did not compete with
champagne.
212. Id. In this factor, the court still found it weighed in favor of the defendants.
213. Id. at 249 n.9 (citing Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, 604 F.2d 200,
205–06, n.9 (2d Cir. 1979)).
214. Id.
215. 164 F.3d 806 (2d Cir. 1999).
216. 141 F.3d 188, 192 (5th Cir. 1998).
217. 164 F.3d at 809.
218. 141 F.3d at 194.
219. Id. at 200 (noting that “the district court made determinations on five of the seven digits of
confusion which either ignored relevant advertising evidence or relied upon the Defendants’ parody
of the sixties lounge scene. These errors have permeated the district court’s findings of fact on the
likelihood of confusion and on each of those digits of confusion.”).
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Whereas Elvis Presley II limited the impact of parody by treating it as
a separate factor, Grottanelli did so explicitly by explaining the
competing product itself could not as readily function as a parody. It
noted first that “[t]he signage on [the defendant’s] business is, in effect,
trademark use for a competing service, since Harley-Davidson offers
motorcycle repair services through its authorized dealers, and
Grottanelli’s placement of his bar-and-shield logo on his newsletter and
T-shirts promotes his repair and parts business.” 220 Because the
defendant offered a competing service, the court held that, “[i]n this
context, parodic use is sharply limited.” 221
In addition to narrowing their analyses, both courts, like Schieffelin,
mentioned Campbell’s relevance to the trademark parody dispute before
them. But unlike the Schieffelin court—which expressly disclaimed
Campbell—the courts in Grottanelli and Elvis Presley II expressly
endorsed and applied Campbell. “The Supreme Court’s parody
explication [in Campbell] as to [expressive] copyright[able] work[s],”
the Grottanelli court stated, “is relevant to trademarks, especially a
trademark parody that endeavors to promote primarily non-expressive
products such as competing motorcycle repairs.” 222 In this context, the
court found that that the defendant’s parody was weak. It did not—as
Campbell required—adequately target the original. 223
This same rationale was also used by the court in Elvis Presley II.
Like in Grottanelli, the Elvis Presley II court first noted that, although it
had “yet to consider parody in relation to trademark law[,] . . . the
Supreme Court [in Campbell] considered parody in the copyright
context, which is relevant to the treatment of parody in the trademark
context.” 224 Then, unlike the Schieffelin court, the Elvis Presley II court
explained what parts of Campbell applied. It claimed that, to render it
noninfringing, parody in trademark—like parody in copyright—must
target the original for comment or criticism. 225
What is interesting about Elvis Presley II, Grottanelli, and Schieffelin
220. Grottanelli,164 F.3d at 812–13.
221. Id. at 813.
222. Id. (citation omitted).
223. Id. (“Grottanelli’s mark makes no comment on Harley’s mark; it simply uses it somewhat
humorously to promote his own products and services, which is not a permitted trademark parody
use.”).
224. Elvis Presley II, 141 F.3d at 199 (citing Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d
769, 776 (8th Cir. 1994); 6 MCCARTHY, supra note 17, § 31:153; Myers, supra note 17, at 181).
225. Id. at 199–200 (“[A] parody of a mark needs to mimic the original mark and from this
necessity arises the justification for mimicry, but this necessity wanes when the original mark is not
the target of parody.”).
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is that they invoke similar analytical techniques, but disagree on the
applicability of Campbell. This disagreement raises an important
question for courts dealing with trademark parody: should Campbell
apply and, if so, to what extent?
B.

Campbell’s Lessons for Trademark Law

In this subpart I suggest that a trademark parody doctrine—while
using a few basic lessons from Campbell—should be more expansive
than the one announced by the Supreme Court. I suggest this because of
several differences between copyright and trademark law.
In the first instance, it is helpful to say whether we should adopt a
Campbell-like definition of parody. That is, should we provide a
parody/satire-like framework from which to determine whether parody
exists? The answer is both yes and no. The answer is “yes” because the
parody/satire distinction can help define the relevant kind of uses the
legal concept of parody covers—even if we decide, as I urge later, that
the variety of uses covered by parody should expand. Part of this
incorporation is also practical: for all the differences between copyright
and trademark law, they both must account for similar speech interests—
First Amendment interests. 226 Just how each regime accounts for each
interest, however, will be different. And so here we can invoke the
answer “no” to the previous question. We shall see that, due to a variety
of differences between copyright and trademark, the protection afforded
to parody and satire should be, as a matter of doctrine, broader in
trademark law than in copyright. Thus, although both copyright and
trademark law ought to and do advance interests of expressive speech,
their protection of each will look different legally.
The distinct purposes of copyright and trademark law suggest that the
test—or at least the scope of the test—for each will be different.
Trademark law, unlike copyright, is not designed to provide a monopoly
right; it is designed to prevent, among other things, consumer deception.
Indeed, trademark law has mechanisms that prevent monopoly control.
Descriptive marks (with no secondary meaning), 227 or names that are, 228
or marks that become, generic 229 are not given any rights whatsoever. 230
226. Others have explored these differences too. See Jaroff, supra note 17, at 664–66.
227. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1) (2006) (stating that one cannot register a mark that is “merely
descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive” of the goods to which it is affixed).
228. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 17, § 12:1 (“[A] generic name of a product can never function as a
trademark to indicate origin.” (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 15, cmt. a
(1995))).
229. David A. Simon, Register Trademarks and Keep the Faith, 49 IDEA 233, 247 (2009)
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Unlike copyrights, which are expressly designed to provide monopoly
power for a limited time, trademarks serve the same purpose (preventing
consumer fraud) throughout their entire existence. This is important
because the key question for fair use is whether the parody causes
market harm. 231 If it does not, copyright excuses the use. That is, indeed,
one of Campbell’s lessons. 232
Although Campbell’s specific focus on market harm to a monopoly
right may not be appropriate for trademark, the idea of market harm
itself is not foreign to trademark law. The difference between copyright
and trademark is that each is concerned with a separate the kind of
market harm, with trademark’s harm being more narrowly cabined by
the law’s purpose. In copyright, the Campbell court worried about a
substitution problem: will the work at issue provide an adequate
alternative to the original? If so, then the copyright owner suffers harm
and the work is not a parody. So, for example, the lyrics of 2-Live
Crew’s Pretty Woman did not risk substituting for those purchasing of
Roy Orbison’s Oh Pretty Woman. 233 Campbell’s emphasis on
substitution reflects copyright law’s more general concern for the harm a
potential work might cause to the entire market for the original. The
concept of the entire market has grown to include markets for derivative
works, and, indeed, markets for almost any potential use of the original.
Trademark, by contrast, is concerned with a different kind of harm
than copyright, and it has two components: harm to the consumer
(purchasing the wrong good) and harm to the markholder (lost or
diverted sales). The consumer is harmed when she buys one product
while intending to buy another. This means she may have bought goods
of a quality other than she expected. As a result of such deception, she
receives the “wrong” goods. Note this is different from the harm in
copyright, which requires no likelihood of confusion; it requires only

(“Trademarks can also become generic by losing their source-identification value if used too often
in inconsistent ways, or in ways that rob them of their source-identifying function.”).
230. Other limitations include things like marks that are functional. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(8)
(listing functionality as a defense to an incontestable mark).
231. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) (“This
last factor [effect on the market] is undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use.”).
232. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994) (“But when, on the contrary,
the second use is transformative, market substitution is at least less certain, and market harm may
not be so readily inferred. Indeed, as to parody pure and simple, it is more likely that the new work
will not affect the market for the original in a way cognizable under this factor, that is, by acting as
a substitute for it (‘supersed[ing] [its] objects’).”).
233. The Court remanded on the question of whether the defendant took more of the music than
necessary. Id. at 589.
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that the good provide an adequate substitute for the original. Thus, the
markholder is harmed not just because the competing product was an
adequate substitute for the original. Rather, harm occurs because the
consumer’s confusion over the source of the product results in lost sales
or reputation (particularly if the goods are of worse quality) of the
markholder’s product or service.
Lost sales and reputational harms do not necessarily occur when
confusingly similar marks are used on products, services, or other
objects not authorized by the mark owner. 234 The nature and context of
the use in question is what makes the harm more or less likely to occur.
So harm to sales and reputation based on confusion is most likely to
occur when the plaintiff’s and defendant’s mark appear on similar goods
sold to similar markets. Thus, a pair of moon boots bearing the mark
Twizzies are less likely to cause consumer confusion with Twizzler’s
licorice than chewing gum bearing the same mark. So where consumers
are most likely to be misled—on goods or services closely related to the
ones on which the original mark appears—trademark harm occurs and
the law seeks to prevent it.
But the market harm here is quite narrow, so that dissimilar goods or
dissimilar purchasers make harm unlikely—even if there is a “potential”
market for the mark. Thus, Campbell teaches that market harm can be a
relevant component to any parody analysis of trademark law. It also
demonstrates that “market harm” means something different—
something narrower—in trademark than in copyright. Trademark
“market harm” occurs only where goods are closely related, sold in
similar markets, and using confusingly similar marks. Potential
substitution—which copyright uses to determine infringement in the
parody context—is not by itself the test for infringement in trademark
law. Why? Because it is likely that for any given good, there are many
competing goods, some or all of which may serve as adequate market
substitutes. Trademark harm, then, occurs only when those similar
products or services have affixed to them a confusingly similar mark, or
when the use of a mark implies sponsorship or endorsement. This
conclusion is also true for the concept of dilution, which is not
concerned with market harm at all. Dilution is concerned, rather, with
harm to the reputation of the mark, not the market in which it is sold.
Thus, as Dogan and Lemley note, harm occurs when a nearly identical
mark appears on a good of lower quality (tarnishment) or on an
234. For a recent exploration of confusion and its overgrowth in trademark law, see William
McGeveran & Mark McKenna, Confusion Isn’t Everything, __NOTRE DAME L. REV.__
(forthcoming 2013).
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unrelated good (blurring).
Second, the constitutional basis for trademark law is weaker than the
legal basis for copyright law. A specific Constitutional provision (Article
I, Section 8, Clause 8) provides authors with legal rights (copyrights) to
exploit their work for money. 235 But trademark law has no analogous
provision. Instead, it grows from the Commerce Clause 236—a clause that
stands as the basis for numerous statutes and regulations, not just
trademark law. 237 Indeed, it took the Supreme Court fifty-three years
from the adoption of the U.S. Constitution (including the Bill of Rights)
to grant relief on a trademark claim. 238
The Constitution empowers copyright law but gives no similar
priority to trademark law. This suggests that trademark law should be
weaker than copyright law with respect to how strongly it regulates
speech. In many respects, this is true. But in other respects trademark
rights are at least as strong as copyright rights. In the context of the First
Amendment, in particular, this important difference has not attracted
much judicial attention. Indeed, the idea that First Amendment
safeguards exist in trademark law is usually deemed sufficient. The same
is true in copyright, where a once-promising standard to ensure First
Amendment limits on copyright 239 failed to materialize into anything

235. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have power . . . [t]o promote the progress
of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right
to their respective writings and discoveries . . . .”).
236. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have power . . . [t]o regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes . . . .”); The
Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93–94 (1879) (holding that Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the
U.S. Constitution did not provide a basis for federal trademark law).
237. See, e.g., Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42
U.S.C. § 2000cc to -5 (2006); Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006).
238. Hannibal Travis, The Battle for Mindshare: The Emerging Consensus that the First
Amendment Protects Corporate Criticism and Parody on the Internet, 10 VA. J.L. & TECH. 3, 11
(2010). The Constitution was adopted on September 17, 1787. U.S. CONST. And it wasn’t until
1870—eighty years after Congress enacted the first Copyright Act—that Congress enacted the first
Federal Trademark Law. Compare Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124, May 31, 1790, available at
http://www.copyright.gov/history/1790act.pdf, with Trademark Act of 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198
(held unconstitutional by The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82). It’s interesting to note that Congress
enacted the first Copyright Act on May 30, 1790, and the Constitution was ratified by Rhode Island
on May 29, 1790. Further still, the Bill of Rights was not ratified until December 15, 1791. U.S.
CONST. amend. I–X, pmbl.
239. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1187–97 (10th Cir. 2007) (finding that Congressional
action that alters the traditional contours of copyright protection should be analyzed under the First
Amendment), remanded to 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (D. Colo. 2009) (holding that URAA violated the
intermediate scrutiny standard to which content neutral regulations are subjected), rev’d sub nom.
Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010), aff’d, __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).

08 - Simon Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

10/10/2013 5:15 PM

1070

[Vol. 88:1021

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

significant. 240 The point, however, is that trademark law’s potential for
overreaching isn’t a function of a constitutional mandate. Given
trademark’s weaker Constitutional basis, additional speech safeguards
are both legally less bothersome and more appropriate. In particular, it
means that, for parody in trademark law, First Amendment interests
should provide broader coverage than the standard articulated in
Campbell.
One might counter that rights granted by the Copyright Act are
stronger than those granted by the Lanham Act. Copyrights provide the
owner with a wide range of tools to censor. 241 Trademark law, by
contrast, provides protection against only likely consumer
confusion, 242sponsorship, and endorsement, and, in some cases, dilution
of mark distinctiveness. 243 It follows, then, that trademark’s speech
protections would not be as robust as copyright’s. But such comparisons
are too simple. Copying a book or even a few minutes of a popular song
is typically infringement. And the owner will be in a nice position to
enforce her rights. But what about using a mark on a product in an
advertisement, in a movie, or in a television or radio broadcast? The
answer is not always clear—and, even when it is, the trademark owner
likely can assert her rights because the costs of defending are so
astronomically high. 244 Indeed, clearance rights are often required for the
trademarks, just as for copyrighted works, used in movies and

240. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 885–91 (holding that the URAA’s restoration to copyright works in the
public domain did not alter the traditional contours of copyright protection because it left in place
the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use defense, and holding that Congress has the power to
remove works from the public domain to comply with foreign obligations).
241. Dilution occurs where the use weakens (“blurring”) or makes unwholesome (“tarnishment”)
the consumer’s association between the mark and goods to which it is affixed by the owner.
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (2006) (describing dilution by blurring), with id.
§ 1125(c)(2)(C) (describing dilution by tarnishment); see also Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.,
537 U.S. 418, 419 (2003) (explaining dilution by blurring and by tarnishment).
242. Copyrights provide the owner with six rights—reproduction, preparation of derivative
works, distribution of copies, public performance, public display, public transmission (for sound
recordings)—which essentially allow the owner to control where and how a work appears, and any
adaptations of the work. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
243. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992)
(stating that “liability under § 43(a) requires proof of the likelihood of confusion”).
244. Mark Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J.
1687, 1696 (1999) (noting that, as a result of trademark propertization, we require more trademark
licensing, which “is expensive. The more we propertize, the more transaction costs we impose on
everyone.”); McGeveran, supra note 68, at 61–64 (explaining the risks for artists and small
businesses in using trademarks and how they avoid using them altogether to avoid liability, and also
noting the increased costs to using trademarks, such as rights clearances).
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television. 245 Thus, regardless of theory, trademarks can often be used
like copyrights (that is, to censor), even though they are, in theory and
historically, tools to control deceit.246 Part of this may stem from
dilution’s rhetorical effect on trademark theory: the dilution right is
premised on the theory the trademark owner must be able to protect and
control the “property interest” in the mark. 247
Even assuming for the moment that there are significant and
meaningful practical differences in the rights of copyright and trademark
owners, there is still reason to think a parody doctrine needs to be
broader in trademark than in copyright. Unlike copyright, trademark
does not have the broad “fair use” provision that copyright law does.
Instead, trademark’s real 248 fair use defense permits a use of a mark,
“otherwise than as a mark, . . . which is descriptive of and used fairly
245. E.g., McGeveran, supra note 68, at 62–64.
246. See, e.g., Menedez v. Holt, 128 U.S. 514, 523 (1888) (“The intentional use of another’s
trade-mark is a fraud.”); Taylor v. Carpenter, 23 F. Cas. 742, 744 (C.C.D. Mass. 1844) (Story, J.)
(holding that the defendant violated the plaintiff’s trademark rights on black spools “in imitating
and using any of the labels and spools, with a view to deceive the public”); Southern v. How,
Popham 143, 79 Eng. Rep. 1243 (K.B. 1618); see also Sidney A. Diamond, The Historical
Development of Trademarks, 65 TRADEMARK REP. 265, 287–88 (1975) (“The beginning of legal
protection for trademarks as such generally is traced to a 1783 dictum in an English case, [Singleton
v. Bolton, 3 Doug 293 (1783),] stating that an action for damages would lie based upon fraud.”);
Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 819 (1927)
(“The protection of trademarks originated as a police measure to prevent ‘the grievous deceit of the
people’ by the sale of defective goods, and to safeguard the collective good will and monopoly of
the gild.”); FRANK SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW RELATING TO TRADEMARKS 4–6 (1925) (quoting POLLOCK ON TORTS 312–13 (12 ed. 1923) and other sources, including
courts, to illustrate that trademarks were used to prevent fraud, and that, although disagreement
existed, court decisions “tend[ed] to insist upon deception of the public as not merely a test of a
violation of a trade-mark right but as the basis of relief against such violation . . . .”). Others have
argued, however, that deceit was not the only interest trademark law sought to protect. See generally
Mark McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839
(2007) (arguing that trademark law originally grew out of a desire to protect producers’ interests,
such as diversions of trade). Currently, at least, trademark can be said to have roughly three interests
it seeks to promote: those of consumers, trademark holders, and competition.
247. Schechter, supra note 246, at 822–30 (arguing that trademark protection should be broad in
scope, should protect her rights beyond merely confusion as to anonymous source, and should
include protection for use of trademark on nonrelated goods); id. at 831 (arguing that the
“uniqueness or singularity [of a mark] is vitiated or impaired by its use upon either related or nonrelated goods[,]” and that its uniqueness and “degree of [the marks] protection depends . . . upon the
extent to which, through the efforts or ingenuity of its owner, it is actually unique and different from
other marks”).
248. The Supreme Court in KP Permanent held that the fair use defense did not require the
defendant to disprove confusion, and that the defense applied even when some confusion exists. KP
Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 121–22 (2004) (“Since the
burden of proving likelihood of confusion rests with the plaintiff, and the fair use defendant has no
free-standing need to show confusion unlikely, it follows (contrary to the Court of Appeals’s view)
that some possibility of consumer confusion must be compatible with fair use, and so it is.”).
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and in good faith only to describe the goods or services of such party, or
their geographic origin.” 249 But beyond this provision and a few other
specific defenses, 250 trademark safeguards consist largely as a patchwork
designed to leave breathing space for speech251 and, specifically, parody.
(Copyright has these too. 252) Indeed, sometimes these “fair use defenses”
are not defenses at all, but, as in the case of nominative fair use (for
confusion), merely reformulations of the likelihood of confusion
analysis trademark law already requires.
This lack of a catch-all, free-speech rule of reason is problematic,
particularly in the parody space. In my previous article on parody in
copyright, I proposed a narrow test that would immunize parodies from
copyright infringement. 253 I argued this test given copyright law’s freespeech safety-net: fair use. “Where the work fails the test,” I wrote,
“hand-wringers need not worry too much, as the fair use test still
applies.” 254 But with trademark law, no such fallback position exists.
Where a defense of nominative fair use fails, a defendant infringes.
249. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2006).
250. See id. § 1115(b)(1)–(9).
251. Only certain kinds of words can be trademarked (arbitrary marks, fanciful marks, and
descriptive marks that have acquired secondary meaning). E.g., Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v.
Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9–11 (2d Cir. 1975) (explaining the difference between arbitrary,
fanciful, and descriptive marks). In fact, the Lanham Act bars some marks entirely from protection
(“scandalous” or “disparaging” marks cannot be gain protection under U.S. law). 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(a) (preventing registration of words or phrases on the principle register if they “[c]onsist[] of
or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely
suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring
them into contempt, or disrepute”). Beyond that, trademark law can regulate uses only insofar as the
commerce clause allows (it protects only trademarks used “in commerce”)—and sometimes requires
a particular kind of use in commerce (use “as a trademark,” i.e., used to identify the source of a
product). 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 17, § 3:3. Even regulatable uses are subject to limitations:
traditional infringement claims rely on a showing of likelihood of confusion; dilution claims require
famous mark, near identity between the marks at issue, and a similar standard (likelihood of
dilution). 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). Finally, trademark law also has its own set of speech-sensitive
defenses, including fair use, id. § 1115(b)(4), abandonment, id. § 1115(b)(2), and some protection
for news reporting, commentary, and parody. E.g., id. § 1125(c)(3) (providing exclusions from
dilution).
252. For those well-versed in copyright, trotting these out is rote: the idea/expression dichotomy
(ideas aren’t copyrightable, only expressions of ideas are copyrightable), 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006),
the inability to copyright facts (facts about the world are free for all, Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel.
Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991), unless they are originally arranged, id., or are facts about
fictional works, e.g., Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 138–39
(2d Cir. 1998)); the originality requirement (a phonebook cannot be copyrighted, unless it’s cleverly
arranged, Feist, 499 U.S. at 345); and, of course, fair use (whatever is not covered by these other
doctrines should fall within this catch-all defense). 17 U.S.C. § 107.
253. See Simon, supra note 18, at 837–44.
254. Id. at 848.
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Worse still, this defense is not much different (if it all) from the
likelihood of confusion inquiry.
Furthermore, the safeguards that do not wade into likelihood of
confusion territory are often insufficient. Whether a mark is a “use in
commerce,” 255 for example, is a rather broad standard. 256 Even imposing
a more demanding standard of whether the use is “commercial” or “as a
mark” may not be strong enough. 257 Although this safeguard fares better
than the “use in commerce” standard, it ultimately does not address the
many cases where the use, although not advertising a product, is still
used as a mark. Where, for example, a character in a movie plows a tree
with a Caterpillar® tractor, does the Caterpillar trademark signify
Caterpillar’s sponsorship or endorsement of, or affiliation with, the
movie? 258 Or, for a racier example, imagine a pornographic film where
the star wears Dallas Cowboy cheerleader attire. 259 Depending on how
Caterpillar or the Cowboys feel about such uses, they may decide to
sue—and, depending on how the judge deciding the case feels,260 they
may win. 261 It also fails as a safeguard because it has definitional
problems that result in factual determinations similar to the likelihood of
confusion analysis. 262 These shortcomings work to discourage the
255. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (providing a cause of action for infringement when “[a]ny person
who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce”
a mark in a way likely to cause confusion or deceive as to sponsorship or endorsement (emphasis
added)); id. § 1125(c) (providing a cause of action for dilution when a person “commences use of a
[famous] mark or trade name in commerce” that is likely to cause blurring or tarnishment).
256. Id. § 1127 (defining “use in commerce” as “bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of
trade, and not merely to reserve a right in a mark”).
257. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 17, § 3:3.
258. See Mark Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413, 416–22
(2010) (collecting cases of dubious claims of trademark infringement, including Caterpillar’s claim
that “use of Caterpillar tractors in the movie [Tarzan] to bulldoze the forest would cause consumers
to think Caterpillar was actually anti-environment . . . .”). See Caterpillar Inc. v. Walt Disney Co.,
287 F. Supp. 2d 913 (C.D. Ill. 2003) (finding use of the Caterpillar trademark did not give rise to
liability because it did not suggest Caterpillar sponsored or endorsed the movie or its message).
259. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979).
260. See, e.g., id. The Second Circuit at various points expressed disdain for the film, which
colored its analysis of the infringement and dilution claims. The court, for example, described the
film, “‘Debbie Does Dallas,’ [as] a gross and revolting sex film whose plot, to the extent that there
is one, involves a cheerleader at a fictional high school, Debbie, who has been selected to become a
‘Texas Cowgirl.’” Id. at 202. It goes on to state that “[t]he movie consists largely of a series of
scenes graphically depicting the sexual escapades of the ‘actors.’” Id. at 203.
261. Indeed, the plaintiff won in Dallas Cowboys. Id. at 204–05 (upholding a preliminary
injunction on the grounds that consumers would likely be confused as to the source of the Dallas
Cowboys cheerleader uniform, which the court found to be a protectable mark).
262. McGeveran, supra note 68, at 78–81 (explaining that “the ultimate question posed by the
trademark use doctrine asks if a particular use invites an interpretation as a source identifier. The
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reworking and subsequent use of trademarks for expressive purposes. 263
Growing trademark rights also counsel in favor of a broader parody
defense. Since 1870, the potential trademark action has expanded from
its original test of likelihood of confusion as to competing products. It
now includes claims for initial interest confusion,264 post-sale
confusion, 265 likelihood of dilution for blurring 266and for tarnishment, 267
trade dress infringement, 268 cybersquatting, 269 and infringement of
merchandising rights. 270 And, although doctrines like dilution impose
more requirements (like mark fame and identity), those requirements are
spurious 271 or ever expanding. 272 Growing rights have become even
more problematic as courts have found evidence of consumer confusion
from surveys showing confusion rates as low as 6%, 273 10%, 274 11%, 275
most straightforward basis to determine whether an expressive use carries source-identifying
significance is to ask whether those who come into contact with it perceive it that way.”).
263. Cf. Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective Creativity, in
THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP 29, 47–48 (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 1994)
(arguing that requiring parody to target the original work in copyright forces the law to
“acknowledge[] [parody’s] subordinate position in the hierarchy of works, and, by extension, the
subordinate position of its creator in the hierarchy of ‘authors.’ . . . . [T]his . . .operates to
discourage artists whose methods entail reworking preexisting materials, while rewarding those
whose dedication to ‘originality’ qualifies them as true ‘authors’ in the Romantic sense.”).
264. E.g., Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Tech., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 294–95 (3d
Cir. 2001) (recognizing initial interest confusion as “probative of a Lanham Act violation”).
265. E.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Urban Gorilla, LLC, 500 F.3d 1222, 1227 (10th Cir. 2007)
(finding post-sale confusion “relevant to the trade dress infringement inquiry” where defendants
sold “body kits,” which were body-tops that could be affixed to the chassis of a truck to make it
look like a Hummer).
266. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (2006).
267. Id. § 1125(c)(2)(C).
268. Id. § 1125(a)(3); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros. Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 209, 213–14
(2000) (noting that “marks registrable under § 2 [of the Lanham Act] . . . has been held to
embrace . . . ‘trade dress’—a category that originally included only the packaging, or ‘dressing,’ of
a product, but in recent years has been expanded by many Courts of Appeals to encompass the
design of a product,” and holding trade dress protection for product designs that have acquired
distinctiveness).
269. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (creating a cause of action for registering in bad faith or trafficking in
domain names confusingly similar to existing trademarks).
270. E.g., Boston Prof’l Hockey Ass’n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., 510 F.2d 1004, 1008,
1012 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding owner of Toronto Maple Leaves trademark could sustain a trademark
infringement action based solely on the use of the mark on a product, regardless of confusion as to
source).
271. Dinwoodie, supra note 90, at 114 (noting that nonfamous marks may actually be more
susceptible to dilution than famous marks).
272. Lemley, supra note 244, at 1698–99 (observing that dilution now seemingly includes
nonfamous and nonidentical marks).
273. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 772–73 (8th Cir. 1994).
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and 16%. 276 Dogan and Lemley point out that much of this evidence is
founded on improperly crafted surveys 277—but courts accepted it
nonetheless.
This “rights expansion” has not gone unnoticed, at least by
scholars. 278 Simultaneous with the growth of rights was the broadening
of things subject to trademark protection, which grew to include
colors, 279 notes or melodies, 280 buildings, 281 facades, 282 and the shape of
golf courses. 283 Over-enforcement and licensing practices grew
simultaneously—cease-and-desist letters are sent as a matter of course
and licenses are generally sought for every use of a mark in movies. 284
274. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding evidence of
confusion based on survey where 10% of those surveyed agreed that Mutual of Omaha “goes along”
with Novak’s product); James Burrough, Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 278–79 (7th
Cir. 1976) (finding significant for confusion a survey showing 15% of those surveyed “referred to
Beefeater liquor” when shown the defendant’s restaurant sign with the word Beefeater).
275. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Am. Oil Co., 405 F.2d 803, 817 (8th Cir. 1969) (finding 11%
confusion “not an insignificant percentage”).
276. Quality Inns Int’l v. McDonald’s Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198, 219 (D. Md. 1988) (finding
16.3% confusion “is an appreciable number that cannot be dismissed”).
277. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 10, at 10–11.
278. See Dreyfuss, supra note 68, at 274–76; Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies,
2011 WIS. L. REV. 625, 632–41 (explaining how trademark rights have expanded); Lemley &
McKenna, supra note 258 (criticizing trademark’s expansion, which made actionable uses that are
likely to confuse as to sponsorship or affiliation); McGeveran & McKenna, supra note 234
(describing how and why the concept of confusion has grown with somewhat distant regard for the
underlying harm for which confusion is supposed to serve as a proxy). See generally Dinwoodie,
supra note 271; Lemley, supra note 244.
279. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 166 (1995) (holding that color
of dry-cleaning press pads could serve as a trademark).
280. See, e.g., TRADEMARK REG. NO. 916522, SERIAL NO. 72349496 (3-note NBC Chime sound
mark).
281. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 763 (1992) (holding that building’s
layout and theme could qualify as trade dress by showing inherent distinctiveness); White Tower
Sys. v. White Castle Sys. of Eating Houses Corp., 90 F.2d 67, 69 (6th Cir. 1937) (finding that unfair
competition law provided protection to the plaintiff’s style of building); Andrew T. Spence, Note,
When a Landmark Cannot Serve as a Trademark: Trademark Protection for Building Designs in
Light of Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and Museum, Inc. v. Gentile Productions, 2 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 517 (2000).
282. E.g., N.Y. Exch. v. N.Y., N.Y. Hotel, LLC, 293 F.3d 550, 557 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding that
“NYSE’s mark consisting of its architectural facade and name is inherently distinctive”).
283. Lemley, supra note 244, at 1713.
284. See Grinvald, supra note 278, at 643–51 (arguing that large corporations are engaged in
trademark “bullying,” where they use their size and power to prevent (often legal) uses of their
marks by smaller businesses); Lemley & McKenna, supra note 258, at 420 (“Whatever fraction of
the total universe of trademark cases these cases constitute, there are enough of them that recipients
of cease and desist letters from mark owners have to take the objections seriously.”); McGeveran,
supra note 68, at 62–64.
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At the same time, a corresponding number of real defenses have
remained noticeably absent from trademark law. Most of the defenses in
trademark law are not defenses at all,285 but safeguards (like “use as a
mark”) or merely reformulations of the confusion test (like nominative
fair use). As a result, users have two options; pay or forgo the use. 286 For
these reasons, some scholars argue that trademark law needs real
defenses 287—or even constitutional speech protections 288 or presumptive
fair uses 289—to rebalance the law. The parody doctrine provides an
opportunity to craft such a real defense, and to make it broad enough to
do more than protect against (low amounts of) consumer confusion.
Oddly enough, how courts have applied Campbell in trademark
parody cases is instructive on how such a real defense should and should
not be structured. Campbell, after all, was a decision about a kind of
“real” copyright defense. Fair use applies after the court finds
infringement rather than before, as KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v.
Lasting Impression I, Inc. 290 requires of fair use in trademark.
Nevertheless, the guiding principle in both Campbell and KP Permanent
is the same: a real defense immunizes conduct even if it is (or may be)
infringing. Courts forget this important similarity when importing
parody analyses from copyright to trademark. Consider how courts
routinely note that Campbell merely altered the fair use analysis; the
decision didn’t even purport to address the copyright infringement
analysis. In trademark law, however, courts have applied the Campbell
decision to the trademark infringement analysis. 291 In doing so, they
have overlooked the important difference between a theory of liability
and a defense to that theory. That oversight means that the parody
doctrine in trademark law is not really a defense at all—but rather a way
to avoid infringing the work. So, to the extent one wants a stronger
trademark law parody defense, Campbell may actually show how to
build one—by moving toward something resembling real defense.
For all of these reasons, the parody doctrine in trademark law should

285. But see 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2006) (fair use defense); KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v.
Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (2004).
286. Grinvald, supra note 278, at 654–57.
287. Dinwoodie, supra note 271.
288. Lisa P. Ramsey, Increasing First Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark Law (Univ. of San
Diego
Sch.
of
Law,
Research
Paper
No.
08-075,
2008),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1273944.
289. McGeveran, supra note 68.
290. 543 U.S. 111 (2004).
291. See supra note 17; infra Part III.
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be more robust than the one announced in Campbell and applied by
lower courts. This means dispensing with the requirement that the
parody must target the mark at issue. A broader parody defense, then,
will include uses that do not merely target the mark, but use the mark in
some expressive way to ridicule or poke fun at any subject. That is, it
will include what the Campbell court called “satire.” To the extent that
Campbell excused infringing conduct, trademark law could learn from
that decision. I argue that we need a parody defense that can survive in
spite of confusion in some cases. In the next Part, I explore what these
defenses would look like.
III. CHANGING THE PARODY DOCTRINE IN TRADEMARK
INFRINGEMENT ACTIONS
In the last Part, we saw that copyright and trademark law have
different purposes, different sources of authority, different speech
protections, and different strengths of rights. Real trademark defenses, I
also argued, have not kept pace with expanding trademark rights. I
argued that these differences and facts are relevant, and that parody in
trademark law should be more attuned to them than it currently is. I
briefly suggested some general approaches to broadening the trademark
parody defense. What was missing, however, was a different, more
directed normative discussion. Although Part I discussed the merits of
various approaches, it didn’t discuss which approach, if any, was best. In
this Part, I engage in that normative discussion. In what follows, I
propose two new parody defenses—one for infringement and one for
dilution.
A.

A Presumption-Based Defense for Parody

Recall that courts use around nine different analytical methods for
evaluating parody in trademark law. 292 Although each method purports
to account for speech interests, all but two of these methods were merely
restatements of the traditional confusion test. As scholars have pointed
out, confusing speech does not necessarily equal (false or) misleading
speech, 293 the latter being an important constitutional standard for
regulation. But more importantly, I have already given a few reasons
why we may not want to throw all our speech eggs in the confusion
basket. Here is a recap:
292. See supra Part I.
293. See Ramsey, supra note 288.
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Rights Expansion: The traditional concept of consumer
confusion has grown to include initial interest confusion, postsale confusion, merchandising rights, dilution (which no longer
in practice requires fame or mark identity), and trademarks have
expanded to include colors, melodies, golf courses, buildings,
facades, etc.
Low Confusion Threshold: Although trademark law requires the
plaintiff to show a likelihood of consumer confusion as to
source, courts have accepted survey confusion rates as low as
6%, 10%, 11%, and 16%. 294
Quest to Stamp out All Confusion/Dilution: Courts have tried to
eradicate all confusion or dilution, rather than appreciable
confusion as to a particular source, or appreciable dilution as to
famous and identical marks.
No Growth of Real Defenses: While trademark rights have
expanded, real defenses (that don’t depend on confusion) have
not.
Confusion Approaches Are not Defenses: Courts altering the
confusion factors—as Campbell has altered the fair use
factors—fail to understand that fair use in copyright is a real
defense, not a way of reframing the infringement issue.
Confusion is not Speech Friendly: The confusion test is
unsympathetic to speech interests that also may be confusing.
Perhaps the most promising method of analyzing trademark parody
was the Balancing Approach. As originally conceived, the Balancing
Approach asked if the title of a work had any artistic relevance to the
underlying work. If it did, then the use was presumptively noninfringing.
This was a real defense. Its major advantage was placing a presumption
in favor of speech. But it, too, had its own shortcomings. Namely, it was
so broad and unruly that subsequent courts were able to hijack it,
converting it into a standard likelihood of confusion analysis. In other
words, it is a confusion trap.
1.

The Presumption-Infusion Approach

The cases show that courts are attracted to the doctrine of confusion.
It seems to easily account for all possible problems in one neat, little
test. But we have seen that this is not true. So what to do? With a
broader parody definition, we need to make some speech presumptively
immune from trademark actions. That is, we should take the Court’s
294. See supra notes 262–65.
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holding in KP Permanent and apply it to more than just “fair use,” as
defined by the Lanham Act. The Supreme Court in KP Permanent
explained that “the common law of unfair competition also tolerated
some degree of confusion from a descriptive use of words contained in
another person’s trademark.” 295 And so, it held, does the Lanham Act’s
fair use defense.
This is what Graeme Dinwoodie means by a “real defense”—one that
allows uses despite the potential infringement that may occur in its
absence. 296 We should apply the lessons of Campbell and KP Permanent
to parody in trademark law by making it more like a real defense. We
should make parody and satire presumptively protected First
Amendment speech. 297 Thus, if the court determines the defendant’s use
qualifies as a parody or satire, then a presumption of noninfringement
applies. That view is generally in line with some First Amendment
scholars, who presume all speech is protected unless shown otherwise. 298
Thus, it is incumbent on trademark owners to show that speech is not
protected. 299 This approach avoids constitutional conflict: it erects a
doctrine that accounts for first amendment interests, preventing a
collision with a constitutional question. 300
But why treat parody as presumptively protected? Because parody is a
type of speech that has value regardless of its potentially confusing
nature. Without a robust parody doctrine, we risk incurring “a rather

295. 543 U.S. 111, 119 (2004).
296. Dinwoodie, supra note 271, at 134 (arguing that KP Permanent is important because “[i]t
shows that even where the harm that the prima facie cause of action seeks to prevent may be
implicated, other concerns—for example, competition, or perhaps the protection of free speech—
might warrant, on balance, that we live with some minor harm to the trademark owner in order to
preserve those other values. That is a real defense.”).
297. Ramsey has argued that the burden of proof in First Amendment cases shouldn’t be on the
user but instead on the trademark owner, who must show that the speech is unprotected. Ramsey,
supra note 288, at 421 (“Moreover, the burden of proof on the misleading or commercial nature of
the speech should remain with the trademark holder or the government. In some cases, the court has
erroneously stated that the burden of proof was on the defendant when it raised a First Amendment
challenge, probably because the First Amendment was listed as an ‘affirmative defense.’”).
298. See, e.g., Michael J. Perry, Freedom of Expression: An Essay on Theory and Doctrine, 78
NW. U. L. REV. 1137, 1146 (1983) (stating that “the principle of freedom of expression . . . forbids
presumptively, not absolutely. . . . [I]f the principle is to be a strong one—and few would deny that
it should be—only a strong justification for governmental interference can be acceptable. So,
government may not interfere with information or ideas useful in evaluating public policy or
performance unless it has a strong justification for doing so.”).
299. Ramsey, supra note 288, at 421.
300. Id. at 448 (“Courts must first attempt to resolve any conflict between trademark law and the
First Amendment by interpreting trademark claims narrowly and trademark defenses broadly in
ways that protect expression.”).
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significant [societal] cost . . . . Sometimes that cost takes the form of lost
opportunities: [i]mportant political and societal commentary and works
of art may be suppressed entirely.” 301 The cost increases as judges use
their discretion to deem infringing those parodies they find distasteful. 302
That is doubly true given all of the aforementioned threats to social or
political speech that threaten the interests of a trademark holder.
With courts continually trying to wipe out all confusion and dilution,
the presumption reminds courts “that the Lanham Act is not a general
anti-copying statute—and indeed that not all copying . . . is bad.” 303
Trademark law is not about preventing others from using trademarks; it
is about preventing particularized harms (confusion and, to a lesser
extent, dilution). 304 Something closer to a real parody defense will force
courts to remind themselves that “free-riding” to make valuable social
commentary is not the same thing as causing particularized harm to the
public (or instrumentally to the trademark owner).
A presumption, though, is typically rebuttable, and I suggest that this
also be true in a more limited way for trademark parody. Under my
proposal, the plaintiff can rebut the parody presumption only by showing
the following elements by a preponderance of evidence:
301. Lemley, supra note 244, at 1696.
302. Langvardt, supra note 11, at 93 (“[S]ome courts in trademark parody cases have adopted a
rather loose view of what constitutes likelihood of confusion, often because the courts’ distaste for
the defendant’s parody.”); see also Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
721, 812 (2004) (“When courts find parodies, satire, and other nonpermissive uses of trademarks
objectionable for content-based reasons, they are very likely to find either trademark infringement,
trademark dilution, or sometimes both. Courts have energetically enjoined unauthorized commercial
uses or invocations of trademarks which include sex and drug references, and anything found to be
‘unwholesome.’”); Dreyfuss, supra note 68, at 293 (“My examination of the current crop of cases
disclosed another revealing factor. Judges who are attracted to arguments grounded in expressive
concerns tend to be colorful writers. They characterize disputes as fights between Davids and
Goliaths; they make reference to Umberto Eco, Samuel Johnson, Chaucer, Shakespeare, Pope,
Voltaire, Fielding, Hemingway, and Faulkner. No one ever accused Alex Kozinski—the self-styled
judge of the ‘Court of Appeals for the Hollywood Circuit’—of writing turgid prose. In contrast, it is
clear from the way certain judges write that they just don’t get it—that they are not gripped by
language and remain unworried by trademark holders’ assault on the arsenal guarding ‘the vibrancy
of our culture.’ I wonder, too, about their sense of humor.”). A similar phenomenon has been
documented in copyright. See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, My Fair Ladies: Sex, Gender, and Fair Use in
Copyright, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 273 (2007).
303. Lemley, supra note 244, at 1714.
304. Dreyfuss, supra note 68, at 285 (“Intellectual property is not, however, about preventing free
rides. If free riding were always actionable, we could not, for example, enjoy a neighbor’s garden or
learn from a colleague’s teaching technique. One merchant could not benefit from the interest a
rival generates for a product category. Intellectual property law is aimed at preventing more
particularized kinds of harm. Thus, evidence that does no more than demonstrate that an economic
benefit was derived from a use, such as a parodic use, of a mark should not suffice to establish
trademark infringement.”).
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(1) the alleged parody of the mark appears on, or is, a closely
related product or service; and
(2) the product or service on which the mark appears is:
(i) offered for sale
(ii) by a direct competitor.
Once these elements are met the court should invoke an Infusion
Approach, as stated in Louis Vuitton II. Put another way, if the plaintiff
shows by a preponderance of evidence that the parodic mark appears on
a direct competitor’s closely related product, this partially rebuts the
presumption of protection. The burden, however, remains on the plaintiff
to show that there is a likelihood of confusion. In analyzing the claim,
courts should adjust the confusion factors to account for parodic interests
by taking the Infusion Approach. If they can show confusion in this
context, the defendant will be liable for trademark infringement. Where
the plaintiff cannot prove all of these elements exist, her infringement
claim dies. I call this the Presumption-Infusion Approach, or PI.
Readers will quickly notice that I have used a variety of important
terms without defining them. Any test that purports to achieve some goal
must be properly defined, and this one is no exception. So in defining
the important words—”parody,” “closely related,” and “direct
competitor”—we must remember that the goal of the Presumption
Approach is to carve out breathing space for speech where consumer
fraud is unlikely to occur. The first task we undertook in Part I, where
we noted that Campbell’s definition was too narrow. Thus, parody here
includes not only uses of a mark that comment on the original, but also
those that use the mark as a vehicle to comment on society. In other
words, it would include parody and satire as the Court defined those
terms in Campbell. Thus, the court in Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin
Books USA, Inc. (Dr. Seuss II) 305 would have analyzed the trademark
claim differently. Rather than assessing the likelihood of confusion (and
ruling material issues of fact existed), 306 the court would have found the
contested uses “Dr. Juice” and “A Cat NOT in the Hat” to be parodic
and presumptively privileged.
Next we have to say what it means for a product or service to be
“closely related.” A defendant’s product or service is “closely related” to
the plaintiff’s when it is intended to be used for the same purposes as the
one to which the original mark is fixed. The divisions should be rather
general, with uses being defined by traditional categories such as eating

305. 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
306. Id. at 1403–05.
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and drinking, clothing, jewelry, furniture, etc., though the categories
need not mirror those used by the USPTO. Where, for example, a
company offers for sale Champagne in a bottle, a user’s Champagne
bottle filled with popcorn seeds would qualify. So would two books—
such as the Dr. Seuss and Dr. Juice books—regardless of their content.
Thus, a company that placed its trademark on motorcycles could reliably
assert that a similar parodic mark placed on motorcycle parts was
“closely related.” 307
One caveat should be noted. Given the large-scale categories, some
further divisions may be necessary. Two categories come to mind,
though others may arise as the rule is implemented. One is the use of a
mark on T-shirts and hats. Because markowners often leverage their
brand to print T-shirts, hats, and the like, a more restrictive rule might be
necessary in cases of these goods. Likewise, uses of marks on websites
should not all be lumped together. Here, the websites themselves should
be examined to determine whether the product or service they offer is
closely related to the product or service offered by the markholder.
Even goods or services that are closely related, though, can be
produced by entities that are not “direct competitors.” And, although
both concepts are linked to one another, the purpose of the “direct
competitors” element is to further cabin the ability of large corporate
interests to suppress speech. This tactic is neither revolutionary nor
foreign to trademark law. In the past, some courts held that only direct
competitors had standing to sue under the Lanham Act.308
Under this proposal, a “direct competitor” must be one who competes
in the same market generally as the parodic user. That is, one asks
whether the market the parodic user targets is the same as the market
targeted by the mark owner, looking at all the goods on which both
marks appear. Thus, in Dr. Seuss II, the plaintiff would not have been
able to satisfy this element. While Dr. Seuss aimed his books primarily
at children, the defendant used the trademarks in a book designed for
adults. This disparity in consumer markets would prevent the plaintiff
from rebutting the presumption. Contrast that scenario with Grottanelli,
where the defendant sought to sell products to the same demographic—
namely, motorcycle enthusiasts.

307. Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 810–12 (2d Cir. 1999).
308. See, e.g., Shonac Corp. v. AMKO Int’l Inc., 763 F. Supp. 919, 933–34 (S.D. Ohio 1991).
“Competition,” though, could and was read more broadly than mere market competition, but also
“competition for reputation and status.” Randolph Stuart Sergent, Building Reputational Capital:
The Right of Attribution Under Section 43 of the Lanham Act, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 45, 53
(1995).
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There is something peculiar about this proposal: it seems to use at
least two of the likelihood of confusion factors. To ask whether products
are “closely related,” one might say, is merely to rephrase the confusion
factor of “similarity of goods.” Likewise, the “direct competitors”
element may be merely a recasting of the “sophistication of consumers”
factor in likelihood of confusion analysis. Although similarities between
the two exist, pointing out these similarities misses a critical distinction
between them. Whereas the “similarity of goods” and “sophistication of
consumers” factors are part of the likelihood of confusion test, the
elements used in PI operate as a trigger. If the plaintiff cannot satisfy
them, then there is no likelihood of confusion analysis to undertake. A
determination about the similarity of the goods on which the mark
appears may in fact carry over into the confusion analysis. And even if
the likelihood of confusion test does apply, the plaintiff’s ability to rebut
the presumption does not determine that confusion will exist. Indeed, the
Infusion Approach may counsel against just such an outcome even
where the goods are similar. It is an analysis the court will have to
undertake during the infringement analysis.
2.

Why Use This Presumption-Infusion Approach?

These definitions, combined with the Presumption-Infusion
Approach, work to safeguard parodies and satire from overzealous or
crotchety trademark owners (or irascible or humorless judges). This
defense does not fall into the confusion trap; it carves out space for free
speech even where some confusion may exist. At the same time, the
Presumption-Infusion Approach does not neglect confusion or trademark
rights either. What it does, instead, is apply an even-handed test to a
limited situation where trademark harm is not likely to occur. So
trademark owners do not have much trademark harm to worry about.
This approach provides several benefits. First, the Rogers-style
presumption ensures that we err on the side of protecting speech, rather
than trademark owners’ interests. It cordons off a portion of speech that
is likely to have social or political value (parody and satire). In this
respect it resembles KP Permanent’s non-confusion-based safeguard for
speech. For even if some confusion is likely, it won’t be recognized
unless it has the potential to cause particularized harm to trademark
owners.
Second, this test protects trademark owners’ rights too: the
presumption is not absolute; it extends only to speech not likely to cause
trademark-style harms. Crafting the presumption this way ensure that
simply calling a use a parody—or even a finding that a use is a parody—
does not negate the rights of trademark owners. A presumption refocuses
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trademark law on harms related to confusion about related products 309—
the narrower harm traditionally protected by trademark law. 310 Where
the parodic products are not related or in direct competition, the
trademark law has no harm to protect against. The presumption has a
built-in balance—the scale is tipped in favor of noncompetitive speech,
even if it may be confusing.
As soon as we introduce direct competition, however, the scale
automatically reweighs the interests at stake. Rebutting the presumption
triggers an Infusion Approach (i.e., a modified confusion analysis),
where the presence of a parodic or satirical use alters the court’s analysis
of whether confusion is likely. Thus, when a parodic or satirical use
appears on a competing good or service, parody—though still given
special treatment—may not be given as much leeway.
Using the Infusion Approach as a fallback has at least three benefits.
First, it provides protection to speech interests and trademark owners at
different places, and where both sets of interests are most important.
Speech interests are weakest when the parodist seeks to confuse
consumers into buying a closely related product sold by a competitor.
Second, these circumstances are precisely the circumstances under
which trademark rights are traditionally understood to operate—
trademark law prevents confusion and consumer fraud. This approach
accounts for this fact by narrowing protection for parody and satire when
products compete directly. Finally, it achieves the objective without
relying on the traditional confusion analysis. 311
The sum advantage of the Presumption-Infusion Approach is
concomitantly to reduce trademark law’s chilling effect on speech and to
protect the markholder’s legal interests. Creating presumptions—
perhaps similar to those that exist in some aspects of libel law, 312 for
309. See McGeveran, supra note 68, at 71–72 (“The multifactor [likelihood of confusion] test
was designed for use in the paradigmatic trademark dispute where the need to accommodate speech
interests does not arise. If two merchants want to use similar identifiers for their products, both
litigants’ interests are primarily commercial rather than expressive, and neither one of them adds
much additional speech to public discourse. Furthermore, both merchants’ interests align with
certain public interests in efficient markets: guarding against confusion and allowing the best or
most informative brand names.”).
310. Lemley & McKenna, supra note 258, at 423.
311. Other approaches have tried to make space for parody by increasing the plaintiff’s burden of
proof when the parody was of a commercial nature. See, e.g., Langvardt, supra note 11, at 93
(arguing that, in the case of commercial parody, courts should have a “disinclination to find
confusion unless the evidence demonstrates a realistic probability of confusion, not merely some
possibility of confusion” (emphasis in orginal)).
312. See N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); 3 RODNEY A. SMOLLA & DAVID NIMMER,
SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 23:1 (2011) (“It is worth noting that while the New
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example—reduces the trademark owner’s leverage to bully settlements
for parodic or satirical uses. The plaintiff must be prepared to offer more
than a theory of confusion. Indeed, she must show that there is even a
threat that the parodic use will compete with the original product. These
are demands trademark law typically makes, but often have been lost in
the expansion of trademark rights and markowners’ zeal for
enforcement.
By now, it should be apparent how this could be applied to thwart
claims against uses like Mutant of Omaha (Omaha Mutual), Michelob
Oily (Michelob), and Barbie Girl (Barbie). 313 The Mutant of Omaha
mark, for example, would prevail without any inquiry into confusion. So
would Michelob Oily and the use of Barbie Girl in the title of a song.
The test can just as easily be applied to trade dress claims, such as using
a Barbie Doll in photography (Food Chain Barbie). 314
On the other hand, the Louis Vuitton II case—the one with the dog toy
called Chewy Vuiton—would probably meet the PI test. The burden, of
course, would be on Louis Vuitton to show that the parody appeared on
a closely related product offered for sale by a direct competitor. A dog
toy may be a “closely related product” vis-à-vis Louis Vuitton, which
sells “pet accessories—collars, leaches, and dog carriers . . . .” 315 There
might be an argument that Chewy Vuiton would not qualify as a direct
competitor, assuming Louis Vuitton made extremely high-end dog
products. But even if Chewy Vuiton and Louis Vuitton were direct
competitors and the PI elements were met, the court would fall back into
the Infusion Approach. Here, as we say in the 4th Circuit’s original
decision, the factors cut in favor of Chewy Vuiton. These cases illustrate
that the truly simple cases will be filtered out by the PI test, with the
more debatable cases resolved in a reasonable manner with the Infusion
Approach.

York Times decision dealt largely with the fault standards that apply to defamation law, in its
aftermath courts have frequently held that other common-law or statutory defamation doctrines may
also reflect First Amendment values, and may indeed come to be understood as required by First
Amendment principles.”); DAVID A. ELDER, DEFAMATION: A LAWYER’S GUIDE § 1:9 (2011) (“At
common law defamation per se (whether libel or slander) created a presumption of malice, a
subterfuge for strict liability. This presumption has been displaced where First Amendment fault
requirements for public persons or private persons as to matters of public concern apply but is
probably still operational in the purely private-non public concern arena.” (footnotes omitted)).
313. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA, Inc. (Mattel III), 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002).
314. Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003).
315. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC (Louis Vuitton II), 507 F.3d 252,
258 (4th Cir. 2007).
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A Broad Noncommercial Defense for Parody in Dilution Actions

Although trademark infringement is the more traditional cause of
action, trademark owners can use trademark dilution to quash parodic
and satirical uses of their marks. If we break down dilution by kind
(blurring and tarnishment), we can see that courts like to apply different
tests where parodies are at issue. Yet, for both blurring and tarnishment
claims, courts resolved 50% of all cases using section 1125(c)(3)(C),
which exempts from dilution “[a]ny noncommercial use of a mark.” 316
For blurring and even tarnishment, this defense seems to be the best
equipped to handle parody. I propose using this defense for
noncommercial parodic uses of a mark in the dilution context. For
commercial parodies, I argue that two separate standards should apply.
For tarnishment, commercial parodies should be totally exempt from
dilution actions. Blurring actions, however, need to evaluate commercial
parodies using an infusion-style approach, altering the statutory factors
used to evaluate dilution by blurring.
For noncommercial parodies, this means relatively broad protection.
Unlike the Presumption-Infusion Approach I proposed for infringement,
this test is not a presumption; it is a complete defense—a real defense.
Noncommercial speech simply is not actionable dilution. This is
probably better than the Presumption-Infusion Approach for at least two
reasons. First, dilution imbues trademarks with more of a property-like
quality than infringement actions. 317 The action itself is premised on the
idea that the trademark holder “owns” the image or brand of the mark.
Thus, a stronger speech protection here—particularly one grounded in
the First Amendment—is less threatening to the fundamental purpose of
trademark law than it would be if it existed in the infringement context.
Second, a presumption that uses competition-criteria is misplaced in
the dilution context. Dilution is aimed at uses of non-confusing marks on
non-competing products. When a company uses Victoria’s Secret on
motor oil, or McDonald’s on motorcycle parts, dilution is the appropriate
remedy under current law. No one is confused by the use of the mark
316. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(C) (2006).
317. Both opponents and supporters recognized dilution as a form of property interest. Compare
151 CONG. REC. 6937 (2005) (statement of Rep. Wu) (arguing in opposition to the TDRA because
“this bill will change trademark law to make it easier for large companies to sue individuals and
businesses for trademark dilution, thus potentially creating rights in perpetuity for trademarks. This
bill states that no actual harm will have to be proven; large companies will be able arbitrarily to file
lawsuits against small businesses and private citizens.”), with 152 CONG. REC. 19,238 (2006)
(statement of Rep. Smith) (“Diluting needs to be stopped at the outset. Once it occurs, the goodwill
of a mark cannot be restored.”).
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because the products are so distant (everyone knows McDonald’s does
not make motorcycle parts and Victoria’s Secret makes lingerie, not
motor oil). At the same time, dilution protects McDonald’s and
Victoria’s Secret against just this kind of use because it is likely to
“lessen [their marks’] distinctiveness.” 318
Yet mark owners often bring dilution claims for competing goods.
Victoria’s Secret, for example, brought a dilution claim against Victor’s
Secret, a small store selling lingerie and adult items. 319 Starbucks sued a
coffee company that marketed its charred roast coffee under the mark
Charbucks, alleging dilution. 320 These are cases where dilution should
not have a foothold; these are cases where plaintiffs use dilution to
hedge confusion claims.
Theoretically, it should be impossible to win a dilution claim against a
nearly identical mark on a competing product; that seems to be exactly
the situation infringement (or counterfeiting 321) was meant to cover.
When no confusion exists, though, trademark owners seek to find
liability any way they can, so they assert a dilution claim. Given dilution
should not apply where competing products are at issue, the precise
formulation of the Presumption-Infusion Approach I advocated for the
parody defense in infringement doesn’t apply to dilution.
So if my previous proposal doesn’t translate to the dilution context,
what approach should we take? Once we’ve settled on noncommercial
use as the place for parody—and we’ve used the same definition for
parody in both infringement and dilution actions—the next question is,
what constitutes “noncommercial”?
Given the legislative history indicating the word “noncommercial”
was meant to draw on First Amendment doctrine, that is the place we
should look. 322 As noted before, the Supreme Court has defined
318. Actually, it may do just the opposite. See Dinwoodie, supra note 271, at 114 (noting famous
marks may actually be less likely to be diluted than nonfamous ones). But, still, this seems like the
prototypical case that dilution was meant to cover.
319. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
320. Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2009).
321. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1115(1)(b) (2006) (providing liability for use of counterfeit mark); 18
U.S.C. § 2320 (2006) (making it a crime to knowingly use “a counterfeit mark on or in connection
with goods services”); id. § 2318 (making criminal trafficking in counterfeit labels, documentation,
or packaging).
322. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, § 2, 120 Stat. 1730 (2006);
H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1031 (“The bill will not
prohibit or threaten ‘noncommercial’ expression, as that term has been defined by the courts.”); 151
CONG. REC. 6936 (2005) (statement of Rep. Berman) (“While not universally supported, this bill
has now garnered the support of the ACLU for accommodating its first amendment concerns. In
section 2(c)(3), the bill addresses the balance between the rights of trademark holders and the first
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commercial speech as speech that does “no more than propose a
commercial transaction.” This kind of speech is “expression related
solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.”323 To
that end, commercial speech has a dual function: to make the speaker
money but also to inform the consumer and society of a product by
distributing information. 324 Thus, economic motivations alone are not
the only question when it comes to deciding what is commercial
speech. 325 An overwhelming discussion of important public issues may
render speech noncommercial despite economic motivations. 326 A mere
passing reference to social issues, however, will not. 327 Where
commercial and noncommercial elements are “inextricably intertwined,”
the scale tips toward noncommercial. 328
Using this “framework,” courts have taken different approaches to
defining “noncommercial.” One commentator has described two
different types of analysis, which in a different setting some race
theorists would call the rule of hypodescent: a drop of one “race” makes
a mixed-race person from that race. 329 One set of courts (the “all is
commercial” courts) take the view that any element of commerciality

amendment by providing an exemption for purposes of identifying and parodying, criticizing or
commenting on the famous mark. The trade groups representing intellectual property owners,
AIPLA, INTA and IPO, have all endorsed this bill.”); 152 CONG. REC. 19,238 (2006) (statement of
Rep. Sensenbrenner) (noting that the proposed amendment to the FTDA, among other things,
“creates a free-speech exclusion for noncommercial use of a mark”); 152 CONG. REC. 2942 (2006)
(statement of Sen. Leahy) (“Furthermore, Senator HATCH and I were successful in including
language that definitively shelters important constitutionally protected first amendment freedoms
from being caught up in the liability net.”).
323. Cent. Hudson Gas v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980).
324. Id. at 561–62 (“Commercial expression not only serves the economic interest of the speaker,
but also assists consumers and furthers the societal interest in the fullest possible dissemination of
information.”).
325. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67 (1983) (“[T]he fact that [the speaker]
has an economic motivation for [the speech] . . . would clearly be insufficient by itself to turn the
materials into commercial speech.” (citation omitted)).
326. Id. at 67–68.
327. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562 n.5 (rejecting Justice Stevens’s view, which “would grant
broad constitutional protection to any advertising that links a product to a current public debate. But
many, if not most, products may be tied to public concerns with environment, energy, economic
policy, or individual health and safety. . . . There is no reason for providing similar constitutional
protection [for statements on public issues] when such statements are made only in the context of
commercial transactions.”).
328. Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 474 (1989) (finding that the subjects
included in advertisement—which included discussion of topics such as economics and home life—
were not inextricably intertwined with the advertisement and therefore were commercial speech).
329. MARVIN HARRIS, PATTERNS OF RACE IN THE AMERICAS (1964).
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renders speech commercial. 330 Another group of courts (the “all is
protected” courts), by contrast, find that any drop of expression renders a
use noncommercial. Criticizing this “all is commercial” approach, the
commentator notes that courts frequently focus on economic harm to the
mark holder, which although part of the dilution inquiry, is irrelevant to
the First Amendment doctrine of commercial speech. 331 At the same
time, immunizing any speech with a hint of non-commerciality may go
too far. 332 So the commentator suggests courts pay more attention to the
content of the speech and its benefits to the speaker, rather than its
negative influence on the trademark holder. 333
Others have proposed various methods for discerning what constitutes
commercial speech. Lisa Ramsey argues that trademarks are commercial
speech when the reasonable consumer believes the “language partly or
primarily identifies the source or licensor of the product.” 334 On this
view, where some speech is not purely commercial or noncommercial—
that is, “hybrid” speech—courts should deem it noncommercial “[w]here
the noncommercial nature of the speech predominates, or the
commercial and noncommercial components are inextricably
intertwined.” 335
Arlen Lanvardt has argued for a somewhat different standard. He
proposes a framework for analyzing the commerciality of parodies based
on three principles provided by the Supreme Court. First, “when the
trademark parodist has used his version of a trademark to help market a
good or service other than the parody itself, the parody is almost
certainly commercial in nature.” 336 Second, economic motive does not

330. Curran, supra note 146, at 1078, 1082–87.
331. Id. at 1096–97.
332. Id. at 1098–99 (noting that a previous case, Bolger, “recognized that messages may
‘constitute commercial speech notwithstanding the fact that they contain discussions of important
public issues[,]’ [and] thus reaffirmed the notion that ‘[a]dvertisers should not be permitted to
immunize [commercial speech] from government regulation simply by including references to
public issues.’” (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67–68 (1983) (footnote
omitted)).
333. Id. at 1097 (“[T]he ‘all is commercial’ cases imply that commercial harm to a trademark
owner is an important element in determining the scope of the FTDA’s ‘noncommercial use’
exemption. But the Court has never taken such an approach in its commercial speech decisions. To
the contrary, the Court’s precedents focus on the commercial benefits accruing to the speaker, and
not the commercial detriment befalling other parties, when classifying speech as ‘commercial’ or
‘noncommercial.’” (footnotes omitted)).
334. Ramsey, supra note 288, at 401.
335. Id.
336. Langvardt, supra note 11, at 84.
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render noncommercial speech commercial.337 Third—similar to Lisa
Ramsey’s argument—courts should classify hybrid speech according to
whether commercial or noncommercial aspects of the speech
predominate. 338 In all cases, the law protects the speech of publishers
and the press as noncommercial expression because of the social value
(education, information, and entertainment) of the speech.
Thus, when crafting a standard for non-commerciality, these
commentators have some good advice. Courts should focus on the
speech content, not the economic harm it may cause to the trademark
holder. The question of harm, if it is taken up at all, is done so in the
elements of dilution, not the exceptions to it. Additionally, courts should
use First Amendment law to define commercial speech, as the Ninth
Circuit did when it quoted Central Hudson to resolve a dilution claim
under section 1125(c). That also means understanding that the definition
of commercial speech is context-specific. 339
In light of these considerations, these scholars’ approaches, when
combined, seem quite palatable. Courts should focus on the speech and
not the harm to the trademark owner: hybrid speech will be
noncommercial where noncommercial elements dominate or are
inextricably intertwined with noncommercial expression.
Under this definition the advertisement in Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v.
Balducci Publications 340 would have qualified as a noncommercial
parody. As I described above, the ads depicted Michelob beer as oily. To
better inform the reader, I’ve displayed them here.

337. Id. (“The second principle[] [is] that speech otherwise appearing to be noncommercial is not
transformed into less protected commercial speech simply because the speaker has an economic
motive . . . .”).
338. Id. at 85 (“Under the third guiding principle, if the trademark parody possesses both
commercial and noncommercial characteristics, it should be treated as a commercial parody when
the commercial aspects predominate and as a noncommercial parody when the noncommercial
aspects weight more heavily.”).
339. Indeed, cases like Fox suggest that the test for hybrid speech is functional and fact-specific:
if you could make the commercial aspect of the speech without the noncommercial elements, the
speech is commercial. Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 474–75 (1989)
(“Including these home economics elements no more converted AFS’s presentations into
educational speech, than opening sales presentations with a prayer or a Pledge of Allegiance would
convert them into religious or political speech. As we said in Bolger, communications can
‘constitute commercial speech notwithstanding the fact that they contain discussions of important
public issues . . . . We have made clear that advertising which ‘links a product to a current public
debate’ is not thereby entitled to the constitutional protection afforded noncommercial speech.’”
(quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67–68 (1983) (citation omitted)). I
would counsel against such an approach as it resembles the Alternative Means Approach.
340. 28 F.3d 769, 776 (8th Cir. 1994).
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The Anheuser-Busch court concluded that tarnishment had occurred
because consumers might think Michelob actually contained oil. But
under this noncommercial test, we would ask not whether tarnishment
occurred (that is a question of harm to the trademark owner). We would
ask instead whether the use was noncommercial. The expression here
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was for “mock advertisement.” 341 The point was to make a comment
about a recent oil spill that may have contaminated Michelob beer’s
source water. 342 There is not any evidence of economic motive of the
speaker; indeed, the speech is primarily informative. Thus, it is
noncommercial.
But what about a closer case—a case where the speech might seem
commercial? Take the case Langvardt finds to be commercial speech
and therefore unprotected: Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. v. Novak. 343
There the defendant used the mark Mutual of Omaha (the name of a an
insurance company) to make t-shirts, mugs, and other paraphernalia with
the mark “Mutant of Omaha” in a variety of phrases relating to nuclear
war. The front of one T-shirt read, “Nuclear Holocaust Insurance” or
“Sponsored by Mutant of Omaha Nuclear Holocaust Insurance Co.” 344
The backside of the shirt read, “When the world’s in ashes we’ll have
you covered.” 345 Langvardt concludes the speech was commercial
because the defendant produced a variety of goods, sold them in a
variety of places, and used different designs on each shirt. 346 But the
question here is not solely the economic benefit to the parodists. We also
need to examine the expression itself, which makes a comment on
important public issue: nuclear proliferation. Although the commercial
gain may seem to make this commercial speech, it is not clear what
element—commercial or noncommercial—predominates. Instead, it
appears the two are mixed hybrid speech. In such a case, the use should
be deemed noncommercial and, thus, nondiluting.
While seemingly broad, the definition of noncommercial I propose is
appropriate in the dilution context. Because parodic marks are both
expression and advertisement under my proposed definition, parodies
may be less likely than other uses of marks to qualify as commercial

341. Id. at 772.
342. Id.
343. 648 F. Supp. 905 (D. Neb. 1986).
344. Id. at 907.
345. Id.
346. Langvardt, supra note 11, at 88–89 (“The defendant did not sell the shirts as a one-time
endeavor. Instead, he sold reasonably large quantities of them at various locations that were typical
outlets for miscellaneous goods. He also sold various other items bearing his Mutant of Omaha
designs. The fact that the defendant had several different designs which he used on the shirts and
other items is also significant: it gives the impression that, in a business sense, he had launched a
whole Mutant of Omaha ‘line.’ Consideration of these facts leads to a conclusion that the parody in
Mutual of Omaha was predominantly commercial despite having a significant noncommercial
component. Therefore, though the call was close, the Mutual of Omaha court was probably correct
in finding a commercial use.” (footnotes omitted)).
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speech. As a result, parodies might enjoy more protection than other
uses of marks. Although this brings parody close to a per se defense in
dilution, there is reason to think that is just the appropriate standard:
broad protection with some room for dilution claims. After all, dilution
is not an attempt to regulate false or misleading commercial speech:
even the weakest-but-successful dilution claims do not involve
misleading speech—that is precisely why the dilution statute exists: to
regulate nonconfusing (which courts have assumed is the same as
misleading 347) “truthful” trademark uses that can dilute mark value.
Dilution regulates nonmisleading commercial speech, which presents a
fundamentally different proposition for First Amendment purposes.
Courts should not be making the same assumption for dilution that
they make for infringement (i.e., confusion is commensurate with
misleading). No court analyzing dilution should fall into the lurking
confusion traps: they should not analyze confusion, and they shouldn’t
use dilution as a way to circumvent a finding of no confusion. Thus, the
regulation of diluting commercial speech is itself less than immune from
constitutional challenge.
That argument has particular force in light of 44 Liquormart, Inc. v.
Rhode Island. 348 The Supreme Court’s plurality opinion 349 in 44
Liquormart stated that a more rigorous review applies when laws
regulate commercial speech “unrelated to consumer protection.”350
Although dilution laws might have some relevance to consumer
protection (a stronger brand means consumers can find things more
easily), they are not related to consumer protection in any strict sense.
The purpose of dilution laws is brand-maintenance.
Further supporting a broad defense for commercial parody is its social
value beyond mere consumer information; parody usually criticizes or
comments on society or the trademark itself. For these reasons, even
parodies designed to make a profit should have some protections—
where, for example, the mark, or the product on which the mark appears,
is the parody (or part of the parody), 351 the commercial nature of the use
should not affect the analysis. Additionally, parodies in the dilution
context (with which we are concerned) will always be used as a mark
347. Scholars contest whether this is actually so. Ramsey, supra note 288.
348. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
349. Plurality opinions are those in which five or more justices agree on a particular result but not
the rationale for that result. For more on plurality opinions, see James F. Spriggs II & David R.
Stras, Explaining Plurality Decisions, 99 GEO. L.J. 515 (2010).
350. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 485–86.
351. The Chewy Vuiton products are just one example of this.
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(otherwise they fall under the fair use defense). If a mark is used as a
source identifier, courts will likely find the use to be commercial—
because it is affixed to a good or service. There may be exceptions, such
as nonprofits, but even those would be at risk. Consider again the
Anheuser-Bush case. Imagine that instead of an advertisement in a
magazine, the graphics had appeared on T-shirts, as in Mutual of
Omaha. A court may find this use to be commercial. But, as noted
before, dilution protection extends to truthful and nonmisleading
commercial speech. Without it being tested constitutionally, at the very
least expressive forms of communication like parody should be
protected. To accomplish this task, we take a broad definition of
noncommercial, including most parodic uses.
Even though the standard I propose would include more speech
within the noncommercial parody heading, there is still a risk courts
could narrow the scope of the defense. And, under my proposed
framework, a commercial parody doesn’t meet the TDRA exception—so
at this point it would be considered diluting. But if our goal is to protect
parodies in a systematic way, then we should limit courts’ ability to
curtail that protection. Indeed, even if courts abided by the interpretation
I proposed, there’s always a risk courts could narrow it at some later
date.
In other words, I assume that, despite the broad definition I propose,
some courts will inevitably narrow their conception of noncommercial
speech. Imagine, for example, that South Butt, instead of selling clothes
under the mark meant to parody North Face, sold toilet paper, diapers, or
other hygienic products. 352 Imagine further it coined a slogan, “never
stop eating,” “never stop sweating,” or something to that effect. In this
case, a court may be tempted to find the use “commercial” even under
the broad definition I have proposed. That conclusion, I suggest, would
be incorrect. Assuming this narrowing occurs, however, what would
happen to the dilution claims? 353
For a tarnishment claim, it seems impossible to divorce the expression
(the play on words and humor) from the harm (negative associations as a
result of associating North Face with excretion). (Some argue that this is
not the kind of harm at least tarnishment is designed to protect
against. 354) That is just the point: any harm suffered by a parody will
352. North Face Apparel Corp. v. Williams Pharmacy, Inc., No. 4:09CV2029RWS, 2010 WL
546921 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 9, 2009) (order denying South Butt’s motion to dismiss).
353. For this example we can assume a court finds the mark famous and nearly identical.
354. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 10, at 11 (arguing that tarnishment does not mean “‘saying
something bad about the trademark owner,’ rather . . . [it means] ‘branding your own inferior or
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result from the expressive component of the mark’s use—either
criticizing or commenting on the mark, or using it to comment on some
other important social issue. It is impossible to sort out the harm from
the expression. The mock advertisement in Anheuser-Bush claiming
water source contamination was the harm—just as the message about
nuclear warfare was the harm in Mutual of Omaha. Although one case
targeted the mark owner and one did not, in both cases the harm derived
from the expressive content. So too is it the case with my hypothetical:
the South Butt mark is not just about toiletry products—it is about
making fun of North Face, or being funny and using the North Face
mark to do it. 355 The point is that expression and harm are tied together,
and inseparable in the case of parody. Thus, to protect speech interests, I
propose that parodies be totally exempt from liability in tarnishment
actions.
Dilution by blurring, however, is a different story. Although
commercial parodies could in theory dilute the mark, courts analyzing
blurring claims involving parody have generally found this not to be the
case. 356 In Part I.B, I explained the different approaches courts use to
evaluate parody. While I have supported using the noncommercial use
exemption to protect parody, that method depends on courts correctly
defining noncommercial speech broadly. Given the risk that they will do
the opposite (i.e., courts may find parodies to be commercial when the
parodies use the mark to sell a product commercial), another layer of
protection is needed. Enter the Infusion Approach: in dilution cases, a
parody finding colors the blurring factors, much as some courts do with
the confusion factors. This adds another layer of protections for parodies
that may have some commercial component.
While it is not a defense, the Infusion Approach should suffice as a
further safeguard for expressive commercial parodies. The approach
captures the reality that commercial parodies have expressive value—
and that, even though commercial, this expressive value might actually
enhance, rather than dilute, the famous mark’s distinctiveness. 357 That
might not be the case for every parody—but certainly for some. And it is
much better for speech to allow courts to sort out whether that is the case
noxious good with the plaintiff’s mark’”).
355. Although I’ve advocated a broad definition of parody, many dilution claims against
commercial parodies will more closely resemble the Campbell rationale—that is, they will target the
mark itself. That is not always true.
356. See, e.g., supra Tables 2, 3, & 4.
357. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC (Louis Vuitton II), 507 F.3d 252
(4th Cir. 2007).
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than it is to simply declare commercial parodies dilutive.
Thus, in the end, the test for dilution I propose is similar in form—
and in some ways substance—to the Presumption-Infusion Approach I
suggested for infringement. The main difference in my dilution
approach—which I call the Defense-Infusion Approach—is that it
includes, as the name implies, a defense to dilution claims. For
tarnishment claims, the defense applies regardless of whether the parody
is commercial. For blurring claims, however, the defense applies only to
noncommercial parodies. Where a claim for blurring is based on a
commercial parody, courts should, after finding by a preponderance of
the evidence that the use is commercial, analyze the blurring factors in
the TDRA colored by a finding of parody. This defense is quite strong—
indeed, stronger than the Presumption-Infusion Approach. But a stronger
defense makes sense in the context of dilution, where trademark owners
are given more property-like interests and, thus, more ability to silence
expressive speech.
CONCLUSION
When courts confront parody within trademark law, they typically use
doctrine to accommodate the First Amendment interests it invokes. In
traditional trademark infringement actions, courts sometimes alter their
confusion analyses to account for parodic uses of trademarks. In dilution
actions, courts sometimes find parodic uses to fall within the provision
exempting from liability “noncommercial” uses of a trademark. In other
cases, courts engage in ad hoc balancing, weighing quasi-property
interests against the interests of the user (not necessarily even the
interest in expression per se), or they may discuss the value of
information.
Regardless of approach, courts typically characterize disputes as
contests between a property right of the trademark holder and the user’s
ability to use (make speech with) that mark without infringing those
rights. The question is set up to favor the trademark owner: does the use
of the mark infringe on her rights, and to what extent? But surely users
have rights too—rights apart from making nonconfusing uses of
trademarks. Indeed, this characterization of trademark disputes as
“property right” versus “privileged use” or “exceptions” can cloud the
analysis, largely because the concept of a trademark right as property has
galvanized courts to eliminate any and all confusion and dilution. 358 In
358. See Dreyfuss, supra note 68, at 293 (arguing that courts have rejected strict interpretations of
constitutional approaches because they are trying to safeguard all confusion and dilution); id. at 277
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pursuit of that goal, trademark actions now include initial interest
confusion, post-sale confusion, merchandizing rights, etc. Further
narrowing the potential uses by non-mark-owners is courts’ willingness
to find liability for likelihood of confusion when surveys revealed
confusion rates as low as 11%, 13%, and 16%, and dilution for lessthan-famous marks. These facts mean that the burden of proof on the
trademark owner is less than demanding. 359
Broadening trademark rights while free-speech defenses remain static
poses real problems for expressive users, like parodists and satirists.
Under this conception, a privileged “use” does not seem to carry much
legal clout when compared to a “right” conferred by statute. After all, if
you have a “right” to use a trademark, the other person has an
affirmative obligation to refrain from violating your right. 360 With
rightsholders constantly asserting those rights, and with the conceptual
scale tilted in their favor, the law and the judiciary lose sight of the other
interests at stake. Nearly sixty years ago, Thomas Emerson identified
this problem eloquently:
[T]he protection of property interests constitutes the day-to-day
job of the government apparatus. Protection of freedom of
expression is more abstract, more remote, less insistent.
Furthermore, advancement of the competing social interest is
more likely to be the direct concern of the groups which
influence and control the government machinery. And the
problem of self-control may be even more difficult in a
government bureaucracy than in an individual. 361
Although discussing express government regulation and enforcement,
Emerson’s point applies aptly to trademark law. Courts are in the
business of resolving trademark disputes—and trademark holders are in
the business of bringing those suits. As more trademark owners clamor
for liability, courts (and Congress) have recognized new standards of

(“At the normative level, it shifts the focus from the pure signaling capacity of the mark (its ability
to denote source and quality) to other functions (such as instilling cachet in the brand). Because it
suggests that all of the value in a mark belongs to the trademark holder, this shift reinforces the
notion that every free ride is actionable.”).
359. Bartow, supra note 302, at 769 (“The implication that a mark holder only has to convince a
court that consumers are likely to be confused momentarily suggests the burden of proof on this
issue can be feather-light indeed. In addition, the proposition that fleeting confusion cannot be
effectively cured at any point in a transaction is confusing in its own right.”).
360. See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied
in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
361. Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877,
928 (1962).
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liability through legislation and judicial enforcement. In the courts, the
trademark owner’s influence is much more subtle. Indeed, the law itself
sets up trademark disputes to favor owners. After all, it is much easier
for courts to “enforce” the Lanham Act than to carefully consider any
countervailing interests—interests that are not readily apparent simply
by reading the Act’s text in isolation.
But law—and courts—should be particularly attuned to First
Amendment interests. The law plays a prominent role in protecting
people’s rights, not just trademark owners’. Expanding trademark rights
marginalizes users in favor of large groups who exercise political control
over the dimensions of trademark law and policy. 362 Trademark
owners—as evidenced by their lawsuits—attempt to censor others based
on the content of their speech. Given the fact that confusion (or dilution)
is the watchword even in parody cases, we should start to either move
away from confusion or supplement the confusion analysis to provide
more space for parodic uses.
To remedy this problem, I proposed we revise the parody doctrine in
trademark law, both for traditional infringement and dilution. First, I
explained how courts have taken a variety of approaches to analyzing
infringement and dilution claims where the mark is used allegedly as a
parody. Each approach had its deficiencies and benefits. The primary
problem was that almost none of them fashioned a satisfactory safeguard
for speech. Indeed, most approaches in the confusion analyses were
merely confusion tests dressed up in different legal rhetoric.
To avoid the confusion trap, I proposed two new parody “safeguards,”
one for infringement and one for dilution. Both tests used the same
definition of parody I suggested earlier in the article, encompassing both
“parody” and “satire” as defined by Campbell. In the infringement
analysis, I proposed avoiding the confusion trap by using a presumption.
This defense would presume parody and satire are protected expression.
The plaintiff, however, could rebut this presumption by showing that the
parodic mark appears on closely related products or services sold by
direct competitors. Once the plaintiff rebuts the presumption, a court
should determine whether the parodic mark is likely to confuse, taking
into account how the parodic nature of the use alters this analysis. For
362. Id. at 901 (“The expansion of organization in our society has left the unorganized sectors
peculiarly vulnerable to infringement of their rights. Freedom of expression within the organized
group (including the government) by the nonbelonging individual, by the small group, and in
connection with the organization of new groups, faces overwhelming hazards. In our highly
conformist society it is from these sources that much of the social value in freedom of expression
springs. Yet these deviant individuals and groups, lacking any other base, must find vindication of
their rights primarily in resort to the judicial process.”).
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dilution claims, I suggested courts analyze whether parodies qualify as
“noncommercial uses” under the TDRA. For tarnishment claims, this
meant parody was a per se defense. For blurring claims, parody altered
the factors courts use to determine liability. Placing parodies under this
rubric safeguards speech in the face of strong, non-traditional trademark
rights—rights designed to protect only the trademark owners’ interests,
not the public’s.
The aim of these alterations is to better protect expressive speech
while simultaneously upholding the purposes of trademark law. And,
because these modifications do not require any statutory alterations,
courts can implement them immediately. If they do, the law will free up
more expressive space within trademark law; users of those marks won’t
feel as chilled by the effects of expansive trademark rights. The result:
More speech and fewer trademark lawsuits.
APPENDIX: METHODOLOGY: EXAMINING PARODY IN
RECENT CASES
This Article focuses on the relationship between Campbell, parody,
and trademark law. This Article studied trademark parody cases that cite
or discuss Campbell v. Acuff Rose, Inc. 363 Campbell represented the
Court’s first major attempt to classify parody in over forty years. 364 To
find all trademark parody cases citing Campbell, in March of 2010 I
entered the citation into Westlaw and conducted a “Citing References”
search. The search returned 4,254 documents citing Campbell. I
narrowed these results by asking Westlaw to return only cases and
administrative decisions citing Campbell. This returned 386 cases. I
further narrowed the cases to those involving the words “parody &
trademark,” which returned seventy-three cases. On January 30, 2011, I
re-performed this search for all cases after March 2010. The search
revealed six new cases, only one of which was relevant and included in
the results. 365
Next, I manually examined each case of the seventy-three cases to
determine whether the trademark infringement claim—either traditional
infringement or dilution claims—included a discussion of parody or an
argument that involved parody. 366 This did not require the section

364. Simon, supra note 18, at 780.
365. This case was CCA & B, LLC v. F + W Media Inc., 819 F. Supp. 2d 1310 (N.D. Ga. 2011).
366. The one exception to this was Mastercard Int’l Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm., Inc., No.
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discussing trademark law and parody to directly cite Campbell. It was
sufficient that Campbell was cited somewhere in the decision. The
reason for this method was to include cases where Campbell may have
been an underlying factor in the Court’s decision, even if the case was
not discussed in great detail. I completed this task moving circuit to
circuit—that is, by examining manually all the cases starting with the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and ending with the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
When examining these cases, I often encountered more than one
decision from the same case: sometimes a district court would render a
decision on trademark parody, which would then be appealed and
decided by the appellate court. So, for example, a district court may
grant summary judgment for the defendant, finding no trademark
infringement on parody-related grounds. A party then appeals that
decision, and the appellate court either reverses or affirms the decision
below. In such situations, I included in my data multiple decisions by
different courts in the same case. In other words, I included appeals and
remanded decisions so long as they cited or discussed Campbell. If the
district court cited Campbell but, on appeal, the appellate court did not, I
included only the district court decision in my calculations.
After collecting and sorting cases in the manner described, twentythree cases remained.
As far as content goes, I included only cases involving trademark or
trade dress where parody was at issue. Thus, I excluded from discussion
noninfringements based on nonparodic rationales, such as genericide.
Excluding these cases avoided tapping into claims on which Campbell
has no bearing. For an example, see Harley-Davidson, Inc. v.
Grottanelli, 367 where the court found the word “Hog” had become
generic as applied to motorcycles. 368 In that case, I focused only on the
claim as to the valid trademark, which consisted of a bar and shield logo.
I used the same exclusionary practice for trade dress infringement
claims: I did not count them in my tables if a court decided them on
nonparodic grounds, such as when a court resolved the trade dress claim
by a finding of no secondary meaning. 369 I excluded these because the

00 Civ. 6068(GBD), 2004 WL 434404 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2004). I included this case—despite it not
discussing parody in its trademark analysis—because its copyright claim was so closely tied to its
trademark claim. Even excluding this case, the data, and the relationships that it shows, remain
unchanged.
367. 164 F.3d 806 (2d Cir. 1999).
368. Id. at 810–12.
369. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc. (Mattel II), 28 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1152–54 (C.D. Cal.
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claims did not involve a discussion of parody and, therefore, were not
relevant to this Article. Where a trade dress claim was resolved on the
same grounds as the infringement claim, I counted them both as only
one claim. 370
I also excluded from my calculations right of publicity claims because
they do not bear on trademark law parody questions directly. Even in
cases that involved trademark parody and some other claim such as right
of publicity, I did not code for any part of the nontrademark claim.
I did, however, code for two variable trademark parody cases that
involved copyright claims. I coded for (1) whether the case involved a
copyright claim, and, if so, (2) whether that court found copyright
infringement. I coded for copyright claims because they bore directly on
whether trademark and copyright claims were related vis-à-vis
Campbell. Claims were counted as “infringement” in both copyright and
trademark cases where a court (1) granted summary judgment or (2)
entered a preliminary injunction on the plaintiff’s claim.
I also coded for how courts determined infringement, both for
traditional infringement and dilution. For the sake flow and argument, I
explained these approaches when we confront them in Part III and IV.
Here I’ll briefly explain my general approach. First, I read all 23
decisions. I then found patterns in the courts’ analyses. For traditional
infringement claims, courts citing Campbell used six approaches when
parody was present. I discovered three other approaches in cases not
citing Campbell. For dilution claims, I again found six approaches to
determining dilution in cases citing Campbell. Although I omitted from
my survey all cases failing to cite Campbell, I did not find any other
approaches in the cases I did examine. In Part II, I explain my findings
and analysis as to each of these approaches. For the time being, the
particulars of the approaches are not relevant.

1998); Schieffelin & Co. v. Jack Co. of Boca, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 232, 251 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding
Dom Pérignon champagne bottle had not acquired secondary meaning).
370. See generally Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC (Louis Vuitton II),
507 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 2007); Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC (Louis
Vuitton I), 464 F. Supp. 2d 495 (E.D. Va. 2006); World Wrestling Fed’n Entm’t Inc. (WWE) v. Big
Dog Holdings, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d 413 (W.D. Pa. 2003); Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc.
(Mattel I), No. CV 97-6791 WMB, 1998 WL 422641 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 1998).

